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Few complaints about administrative law are pressed more in-
sistently than the charge that the administrative process is "over-
judicialized."1 Although discordant notes to the contrary are
sometimes heard,' the dominant chord of criticism has long been that
administrative agencies have become too attached to judicial forms of
proceeding, particularly when formulating policy rules and standards.
The suggestion has been made that to improve agency performance,
policy-making and judicial functions should be separated and allocated
to different agencies.' However, institutional separation has thus far
won few supporters." Nevertheless, there continues to be widespread
concern that agencies tend to subordinate broad policy planning to
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1958, Harvard
University; LL.B. 1961, Stanford University. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
'See, e.g., J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
16-17 (1960); E. REDFORD, NATIONAL REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, NEED FOR A NEW
Loox 14-15 (1959); Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial,
48 A.B.A.J. 243 (1962).
2 ,See, e.g., COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT, LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 45-93 (1955).
3 See, e.g., N. MINow, EQUAL TIME: THE PRIVATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIc
INTEREST 277-304 (1964); Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regu-
latory Commissions, 69 YALE LJ. 931 (1960).
4 E.g., W. CAgy, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 133-34 (1967) ; 1 K.
DAvIS, ADMnISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 1.04(5), at 17-19 (Supp. 1965) ; H. FRIENDLY,
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 161-62 (1962) ; Auerbach, Some Thoughts on;
the Hector Memorandum, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 183. For a somewhat different criticism
of such separation, pointing out the cost and inefficiency the Hector-Minow scheme
might engender, see Loevinger, Book Review, 68 CoLu . L. REV. 371, 377-79 (1968).
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adjudication of particular controversies. In lieu of a complete insti-
tutional separation, agencies have been urged to reform their procedures
to make greater use of rulemaking procedures in resolving policy issues
and to establish regulatory standards without the restrictions of ad-
judicatory procedures.'
Though there is already a considerable body of literature on the
subject,' current judicial and administrative trends in this area warrant
yet another look at the uses of rulemaking and adjudication, as well as
a comment or two on administrative procedure in general.
I. THE RULEMAKING POWER
A. The Basic Issue: The Storer and Texaco Cases
The point of departure for any discussion of the power of agencies
to employ rulemaking to formulate policies and thereby to delimit
consideration of issues in subsequent adjudicatory proceedings is the
Storer Broadcasting case.7  In Storer, the Federal Communications
Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend its rules
which had previously limited the number of radio and television stations
that could be held under common ownership or control.' Long after
the receipt of the initial notice, but before the amendment was adopted,
Storer applied for an additional station, although it held the maximum
5 The discussion of rulemaking throughout this Article is focused on procedures
characteristic of proceedings under § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (Supp. IV, 1969) [the Administrative Procedure Act is hereinafter cited as
APA], rather than rulemaking for which a trial-type hearing is required either by
statute, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1964), or by an
agency's interpretation of a statute, see 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE
§ 6.06, at 379-81 (1959) (discussing ICC practice in promulgating various motor carrier
rules)-and which is conducted pursuant to §§ 7 and 8 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57.
(Supp. IV, 1969). In the latter type of "rulemaking" the procedures mandated are
identical to those prescribed for "adjudication" except that internal separation of func-
tions is required for "adjudication" under §5 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. IV,
1969), but not for "rulemaking." See Wilson & Co. v. United States, 335 F2d 788,
796 n.3 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965) ; American Tel. & Tel. Co., 6
P & F RADIO REG. 2d 535 (1965). Although some agencies often use hearing proce-
dures to promulgate rules and standards, it is the non-hearing procedure under § 4 that
is normally the frame of reference for those urging greater use of "rulemaking"
procedures in formulating agency policy.
I For a representative sampling, see Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Ad-
judication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HRv. L. REv. 921 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Shapiro] ; FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regu-
lation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8365-68 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FTC Statement of
Basis]; Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22 LAW
& CONTEIP. PROB. 658 (1957) ; Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-
Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781 (1965); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers
of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
t United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
8 The amended multiple ownership rules prohibited common ownership or control
of more than 7 AM and 5 FM radio stations and 5 television stations. The rules
currently prohibit common ownership or control of, or interest in, more than 7 AM
and FM radio stations and 7 television stations, no more than 5 of which television
stations may be VHF. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1969).
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number allowable by the new rules. Storer participated in the rule-
making proceedings by filing a statement opposing the amendments, but
the Commission entered an order amending its rules as proposed and
simultaneously dismissed Storer's application for an additional station
as not conforming to the new rules. Seeking judicial review of the
agency action, Storer argued principally that the new rules deprived
it of the right to have the "full hearing" which the Communications
Act makes a prerequisite to the denial of any application.9 Reversing
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's rule-
making procedure. The Court seemingly had little difficulty in re-
jecting Storer's argument that the Commission could not, by general
rule, set limitations on licensing and then summarily reject license ap-
plications not conforming to those limitations. Having noted what
Storer itself conceded-that the Commission need not hold a hearing
before denying a license to operate a station in ways contrary to the
statute-the Court concluded that specific statutory terms did not define
the outer limit of the FCC's power, and that the agency has general
authority to promulgate rules not inconsistent with the Communications
Act or other law. Because the power to promulgate rules was re-
garded, in essence, as tantamount to the power to add to the con-
ditions of the statute, any application inconsistent with the general
rules promulgated could be dismissed without a hearing, just as if it
were inconsistent with the statute itself. Notwithstanding its willing-
ness to accord expansive powers to the FCC to promulgate "legislative"
orders, the Court did emphasize one limitation. Citing dicta from
its earlier opinion in the NBC case,'" it cautioned that there must be
provision for some "flexibility" in the implementation of the rules to
insure that they will always conform to possible variations or changes
in what the "public interest" requires. However, in Storer, it found
adequate provision for such flexibility in the Commission's general
procedural regulations which permitted applicants to seek amendments
or waivers of its rules.'
Storer did not represent a sharp break in FCC practice, for the
FCC had long relied on rulemaking in a number of areas, particularly
in allocations matters, and its rules had been sustained on the merits,
9 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (e) (1964).
110 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943).
11 Despite Storer's emphasis on an explicit provision for waiver, the fact that the
power to promulgate and administer rules necessarily includes the power to grant
exceptions or waivers where justified suggests that a specific provision for waiver is
not a prerequisite to seeking waiver or judicial review of a denial of waiver. If the
agency applies the rule in a wooden fashion, judicial review is available, as indicated
by the Court, 351 U.S. at 205, and by a recent decision of the D.C. Circuit reversing
an agency's refusal to give "serious consideration" to a waiver 'request, WAIT Radio
v. FCC, 16 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 2107 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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though the hearing issue had not been determined.'" But a reasonable
expectation following Storer would have been that other major federal
agencies, with similar but largely neglected rulemaking powers, would
have found in Storer an invitation to implement rulemaking powers in
the manner of the FCC. It is surprising, therefore, that agencies have
been rather slow to respond to the invitation. More recently, several
of the major agencies have increased their use of rulemaking pro-
cedures,'" but any trend towards rulemaking still appears to be slow.
Although various explanations for the reluctance of agencies to follow
the lead of the FCC have been offered, 4 they are less than fully con-
vincing.'5 Yet this is a tangential matter. It is sufficient simply to
12 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (sustaining "chain broadcasting"
rule) ; Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(sustaining Sixth Report); General Mobile Radio Serv., 13 F.C.C. 1190 (1949)
(interservice allocation); Sixth Report on Television Allocations, 1 P & F RADIO
REG. (pt. 3) 91:601 (1952).
Is See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1969) (FPC rules governing price changing clauses
in natural gas sales contracts); 14 C.F.R. § 207.6(b) (1969) (CAB rule restricting
off-route charters of all-cargo carriers) ; 49 C.F.R. § 1090 (1969) (ICC "piggyback"
regulations); 16 C.F.R. §§ 401-14 (1969) (FTC trade regulation rules).
14 See Shapiro passim.
15 For example, it is suggested that policy declared in adjudicative proceedings is
more likely to withstand review than policy declared by rulemaking. Id. 941, 944-45.
I am inclined to doubt this. Certainly, as a routine matter, judicial review of legisla-
tive rulemaking under § 4 of the APA seems less rigorous than for adjudicative pro-
ceedings, see note 92 infra & accompanying text, as Shapiro appears to concede.
Shapiro 947.
Another explanation offered is that the agency has greater freedom to disregard
prior adjudication than to disregard rules. Id. 947-52. In support of this conclusion,
Shapiro notes that the CAB and FCC have been granted considerable latitude in apply-
ing the factors of competition and public interest in certification and licensing hearings,
and contrasts this freedom with cases reversing agency departures from regulations.
Id. 951 & n.113. Nevertheless, even Shapiro seems reluctant to conclude from these
examples that judicial treatment of agency departure from precedent differs from
such treatment of departure from regulations. See id. 949-50. Nor do his examples
demonstrate any difference. In fact, the courts have allowed the FCC and CAB
considerable freedom in applying standards in licensing adjudication, but they have
not been completely permissive. See, e.g., City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F,2d 583,
588-89 (1st Cir. 1965) (CAB reversed for failure to articulate standards for decision
and inconsistency with prior decisions) ; cases cited, Shapiro 950. If the courts have
tolerated departure from prior adjudicatory decisions, they have also allowed agencies
to be inconsistent in the application of substantive policies promulgated in rulemaking
proceedings. See Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.
1962) ; cases cited note 67 infra & accompanying text.
Shapiro further suggests that agencies may prefer adjudication because it allows
them greater freedom to apply policy retroactively. Shapiro 944-45. Although he
concedes that courts have allowed retroactive application of regulations in a number
of cases, he concludes, nevertheless, that courts have been "a good deal more prag-
matic" in allowing retroactive application of rules declared in adjudication. Id. 955.
But an examination of the authorities, including those cited by Shapiro, does not yield
any significant distinction. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S.
370 (1932), might suggest such a distinction, but it can be interpreted otherwise, and
any distinction drawn in that case may be of limited application. If an Arizona
Grocery distinction exists, it did not, for example, prevent retroactive regulation in
the cases cited in Shapiro 955, or the more recent case of Atlas Tack Corp. v. New
York Stock Exchange, 246 F2d 311 (1st Cir. 1957), where the court upheld the
action of the SEC in delisting a corporation because its condition in 1953, 1954, and
1955 did not conform to standards contained in exchange rules promulgated in 1955.
The court, although not convinced the rule was retroactive, relied on SEC v. Chenery
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note that the reluctance to invoke substantive rulemaking powers in
varied situations meant that until quite recently there has been little
occasion to consider the limit of the range and scope of the rulemaking
authority under Storer.
In 1964, in FPC v. Texaco, Inc.,16 the issue of an agency's power
to foreclose by rulemaking, issues normally demanding adjudicatory
procedures was again before the Supreme Court, and again the agency's
use of rulemaking was sustained." Adding nothing of significance to
what had been said in Storer, Texaco, at most, made it perfectly clear
that the Storer holding was not confined to the FCC. However, it did
not resolve important questions, left unanswered by Storer, concerning
the extent of the rulemaking authority and what, if any, limitations
surround its exercise: To what extent do agencies without a specific
statutory grant of power to promulgate "legislative" regulations have
power, nevertheless, to promulgate such regulations as a necessary
incident of their regulatory or quasi-judicial powers? Is any dis-
tinction to be drawn between the alteration of existing rights or
privileges and the prospective alteration of the status of persons who
may appear before the agency in the future? Under what circum-
stances can the rulemaking power be used to alter rights or privileges
in individual cases? 's
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), in holding that retroactivity would not invalidate its
application. In Optical Workers' Union v. NLRB, 227 F2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1955),
the court, in dictum, rejects any distinction based on Arizona Grocery:
[T]he Board has authority to adopt and reverse policy, either in the form of
an individual decision or as rulemaking for the future . . . without regard to
whether such action strictly conforms to the rules applicable to courts or
legislative bodies.
It seems more plausible that agency reluctance to use rulemaking is due to simple
reluctance to engage in broad policy planning efforts than to any perceived advantages
in one form of procedure. Shapiro does not ignore this point but he appears to give
it slight weight. Shapiro 944.
16377 U.S. 33 (1964).
17 The FPC promulgated regulations providing that only certain price changing
provisions in the contracts of independent natural gas producers were permissible and
that any producer's application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity
under § 7 of the Natural Gas Act would be rejected if the contract submitted in sup-
port of the certificate contained any of the forbidden provisions. Thereafter tvo
producers, both of whom had participated in the prior rulemaking proceedings, filed
certificate applications containing forbidden provisions. The Commission rejected
the applications summarily and was reversed by the court of appeals on the ground
that § 7 required the applications to be set for a hearing. The Supreme Court in turn
reversed, holding that § 7 did not preclude the Commission from particularizing
statutory standards through rulemaking and "barring at the threshold those who
neither measure up to them nor show reasons why in the public interest the rule
should be waived." Id. at 39.
18 One issue raised in Texaco but not in Storer was the problem of review of the
validity of an underlying regulation on the basis of a limited record. The record in
Texaco contained only the orders summarily rejecting contracts for noncompliance
with FPC regulations. It did not include any statement on the basis of the regulations
or facts on which their validity could be judged. This inability of the court to review
the regulations themselves was a major factor in the court of appeals holding that the
FPC was required to grant a full evidentiary hearing before it could reject the con-
1970]
490 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
B. Specific Statutory Authority as a Prerequisite of the
Rulemaking Power: The Case of the
Federal Trade Commission
In contrast to other major federal regulatory agencies which
exercise licensing and extensive regulatory authority, the Federal Trade
Commission has traditionally been viewed as a prosecuting and ad-
judicating agency. Except in those few isolated instances in which
specific legislative rulemaking authority has been conferred on the
agency,' 9 there are serious doubts whether the Commission has any
authority to promulgate binding rules on substantive matters. Although
section 6 (g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act does grant the
power "to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions [of the Act]," 20 legislative history suggests that this
grant was intended to be no more than a routine grant of authority to
promulgate procedural rules and did not confer any authority on the
agency to use rulemaking to formulate and implement substantive
policy.2,
It is not surprising that the FTC disputes,' as do a number of
commentators,2 3 an interpretation of the Act that denies the agency
tracts, 317 F.2d 796, 804-5 (10th Cir. 1963), and it was the basis of Justice Stewart's
dissent, 377 U.S. at 45. In reversing the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court left open
the problem which troubled the court of appeals. It has been suggested that this
problem can be resolved by transfer of proceedings to a district court for factual
determination. L. JA= 'a & N. NATHANSON, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 788
(3d ed. 1968). A simpler solution is to remand to the agency with orders to inform
the court of the reasons for the rule and to provide such data as would be in the
record if the appeal were taken from the rule itself, Automotive Parts & Accessories
Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F2d 330, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Of course, the problem of a
limited record does not arise if the review is of the regulations themselves. Such
review is likely to be available in most cases; see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967).
19The Commission has specific authority to promulgate rules, enforceable by
criminal penalty, under the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§70a(a)-(c), 70e(c), 70i (1964); the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 68d(a), 68h (1964); the Fur Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 69f(b), 69i
(1964). It has similar authority to promulgate rules, not enforceable by a criminal sanc-
tion, under the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1194(c) (1964), and it
has authority to promulgate quantity-limits rules under § 2a of the Clayton Act,
38 Stat. 730 (1964), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
2015 U.S.C. §46(g) (1964).
2 1 See 51 Cong. Rec. 14931-32 (1914) (statement of Congressman Covington);
id. 14938.
22See FTC Statement of Basis 8369. Although the FTC relies in part on § 6(g)
of the Act, the Commission builds its case principally on "inherent powers." See
id. 8365-69.
23 In accord with the view that power to promulgate trade regulation rules is
inherent in the Commission's adjudicatory powers is Auerbach, The Federal Trade
Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. P~v. 383, 457 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Auerbach]. See also Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal
Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678, 740-50 (1966) (supporting the Commission's authority
on the basis of § 6(g) and general policy considerations). Other comments, pro and
con, are collected in Wegman, supra at 740 n.280.
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substantive rulemaking power. Nevertheless, until 1962 the Commis-
sion made no claim to such a general power under section 6 (g). Such
efforts as were made to promulgate general standards, and particularly
to secure industry-wide compliance, were confined to "traditional" en-
forcement procedures: for example, industry-wide investigations fol-
lowed by the issuance of form complaints against a large number of
violators accompanied by a proposed consent agreement and order,24
and the issuance of trade practice rules, guides (practice rules and
guides are treated together as "industry guides"), and advisory
opinions." Whether or not these and other procedures might have
been employed with greater vigor to effect uniform standards and
industry-wide compliance, there has been dissatisfaction with the record
of their effectiveness in achieving industry-wide enforcement. 6
As a partial response to what it felt were inadequacies in existing
adjudicatory procedures, the Commission in 1962 adopted its trade
regulation rules procedure providing for the issuance of rules to express
the "experience and judgment of the Commission" concerning the sub-
stantive requirements of the statutes which it administers." Though
somewhat similar to the Commission's industry guides, which are
advisory interpretations of relevant legal requirements, trade regulation
rules are apparently intended to have greater finality and effect-that
is, to be binding "legislative" rules. The rules provide that in any
subsequent proceeding in which the rule is relevant to the adjudication
of any issue, the Commission "may rely upon the rule to resolve such
issue, provided respondent is given a hearing on legality and pro-
priety of applying the rule in the particular case." 28 There is some
uncertainty about the meaning of the phrase "rely upon," and the
Commission to date has had no occasion to clarify its precise meaning,
or to indicate just how, if at all, the trade regulation rules differ in
24 See Auerbach 449-51.
28 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.12 (1968). See generally Auerbach 452-55, 461-65.
2 6 Id. 449.
2-716 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1968). The first application of the trade regulation rule
procedure occurred in 1964, when the FTC promulgated several general rules, the most
notable of which was the cigarette advertising rule that it was an unfair or deceptive
practice to fail to disclose clearly and prominently on all cigarette containers-boxes,
cartons, and packs-that cigarette smoking "is dangerous to health and may cause
death from cancer and other diseases." 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964). However, before
the cigarette rule was implemented, Congress passed the Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. III, 1968), which suspended the
affirmative disclosure requirements until July 1, 1969. The moratorium having ex-
pired, the Commission has pending a proceeding to reinstate the 1964 rule, with slight
modifications. See 34 Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969), corrected 34 Fed. Reg. 8125 (1969).
Since the cigarette rule, the Commission has promulgated a number of other trade
regulation rules, all but one dealing with unfair or deceptive trade practices. See, e.g.,
16 C.F.R. § 403 (1968) (prohibiting the use of words such as "leakproof" or "guaran-
teed leakproof" in the advertisement and sale of dry cell batteries).
2S 16 C.F.R. § 1.12(c) (1968).
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effect from industry guidelines (they would seem to serve little purpose
if they did not have some different effect). But the intent of the
Commission appears to be to make the rules dispositive of those issues
to which it speaks, in effect, foreclosing such issues from future contest
in subsequent proceedings unless the party against whom they are
implemented can prove that its situation is (1) not covered by the rule
or (2) is so unique that an exception to the rule is justified. If this
interpretation of the effect of the rules is correct, 9 its practical effect
is to substitute a rule for adjudication (as in the Storer and Texaco
cases) since, even though a respondent has a right to a hearing on the
issue of the applicability of the rule, he is presumably denied an oppor-
tunity to challenge it on the merits.
The Commission's authority to promulgate its trade regulation
rules must be regarded as still an open and debatable issue.30 Whether
the FTC has specific statutory authority under section 6 (g) of the Act
has received extensive comment elsewhere,"' and it would be pointless
to reiterate the arguments pro and con, which are based largely on
the legislative history. Despite the attention it has received, however,
the question of specific statutory authority does not go to the heart
of the Commission's case for rulemaking power: that the power to
promulgate such rules is inherent in its adjudicative functions. The
Commission argues:
Every tribunal that decides cases-even a Federal court
established under Article III of the Constitution-is perforce
engaged in substantive rule-making. The common law is a
body of judge-made substantive rules, principles, and pre-
scribed standards of conduct. . . . Needless to say, there is
no statute which permits judges to make rules in this fashion.
29 Others have come to similar conclusions regarding the effect of the rules. See
Shapiro 965-67; Symposium, Reflections on the Conduct of an Administrative Hearing,
20 AD. L. REv. 101, 126 (1967) (remarks of Rufus Wilson, Chief of FTC Division of
General Trade Restraints). Professor Davis, however, takes the view that "reliance"
does not give preclusive effect to the rules. See 1 K. DAvis, ADmINISTRATV-E LA-W
TRaETIsE § 5.04, at 123-28 (Supp. 1965). He supports this view on the basis that the
FTC's case for rulemaking authority relies on its power to take official notice, which
is, of course, rebuttable. Id. § 5.04, at 128. But the FTC appears to believe that if
the kinds of issues resolved by trade regulations were handled by official notice, rebuttal
would not be necessary. See Statement of Basis 8372; note 37 infra and accompanying
text. It is perhaps noteworthy that in a recently issued complaint charging respondents
with unfair and deceptive practices the Commission has not only alleged a violation
of the statute but has also specified that the acts violated a trade regulation rule
covering the practice in question. See Shell Oil Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,014 at
21,267 (FTC 1969). This seems to hint that the Commission intends to treat the rules
as conclusive, and perhaps even directly binding.
30 In Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745 (1968) (D.D.C. 1968), appeal
docketed, No. 22,277, D.C. Cir., 1969, it was sought to enjoin institution of a rule
proceeding, but the suit was dismissed for lack of ripeness. To the author's knowledge
this is the only case to date in which the Commission's power has been challenged
in court.
31 See Wegman, supra note 23, at 740 n.280, 745-46; Shapiro 960-61.
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None is necessary. The laying down of substantive principles
in the course of adjudication is inherent in the adjudication
process.
If the courts may and do make rules in the course of
adjudicating, a fortiori the Commission may-and indeed is
under a positive obligation to-engage in substantive rule-
making in its adjudications 2
The Commission presses its "inherent authority" argument to the
point of contending that even if 6(g) were not in the Act, it would
have substantive rulemaking authority,33 at least with respect to the
type of "rule" which it promulgates through its trade regulation
procedures.
Given this approach, the particular interpretation of section 6(g)
is immaterial, since the search for rulemaking authority becomes not
a matter of finding a specific statutory grant of authority, but rather a
search to see if for some reason Congress has specifically withheld
rulemaking authority, intending that the agency proceed only by tra-
ditional adjudicatory methods. This is the heart of the Commission's
case for rulemaking authority and the point which is of crucial sig-
nificance for other administrative agencies. 4 The FTC's argument
is provocative, but it is not completely persuasive. The Commission's
assertion that even article III courts engage in a kind of rulemaking
is unassailable; " it will not therefore be denied that an administrative
agency, like a court, can go beyond the immediate task of deciding a
particular case in order to create a general rule that binds parties com-
ing before it in the future. But this is not dispositive of challenges to
the validity of the rulemaking power, because the question is not
whether an agency or a court can formulate rules in the process of
adjudicating cases, but to what extent they can do so independent of
adjudication and the constraint of adjudicatory procedures.
The Commission's argument on this point is very involved and
somewhat unclear. Any attempt to summarize it runs the risk of
distortion. Essentially the argument is grounded on an analogy to the
use of official notice and extra-record reliance on "accumulated knowl-
32 FTC Statement of Basis 8365-66.
33Id. 8369.
34 The question of the FTC's authority to promulgate legislative regulations
would seem to have particular pertinence to the Food & Drug Administration in con-
nection with its recent promulgation of "Good Manufacturing Practice" food regula-
tions. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 128 (1969) ; Cody, Authoritative Effect of FDA Regulations,
24 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 195 (1969) ; Forte, The GMP Regulations and the Proper
Scope of FDA Rulemaking Authority, 56 GEo. L.J. 688 (1968). If the FTC is found
to have "inherent" rulemaking authority would this not be true of the FDA as well,
thereby mooting the question whether Congress gave it such authority in § 701 (a)
of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a) (1964) ?
3 5 See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 145 (1962).
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edge and experience," and other matters "traditionally regarded as
background or legislative facts or matters of law, policy or discretion."
A determination that a particular course of conduct is unlawful, it
argues, rests not only on evidentiary facts developed in adjudication,
but also on "legislative" or "nonevidentiary" facts which "are not re-
quired to be determined adjudicatively," but may be determined by
official notice or simply by reliance on extra-record knowledge. And
if the Commission can use these methods for determining "legislative
facts" in individual cases, then, the Commission argues, it may also
determine these facts in a rulemaking proceeding and it "should not be
required that they be redetermined de novo in a subsequent adjudicative
proceeding." 6
Despite a superficial attractiveness, the Commission's argument
that the establishment of an uncertain rulemaking power is based on an
undefined power to take official notice or rely on extra-record "knowl-
edge and experience" rests on a very weak foundation. The Commis-
sion nowhere examines in depth the threshold question of the proper
use of official notice or extra-record facts, but rests instead on abstract
generalizations about such concepts as "legislative facts," '7 "non-
evidentiary facts," and "accumulated knowledge," 8s which are left
undefined. However, to explore these arcane matters here would
only result in an unnecessary distraction. Even if fhe Commission's
36 FTC Statement of Basis, 8371-72.
37The Commission's argument is advanced in connection with the cigarette
advertising case in which it identifies the following general fact issues: (1) the health
hazards of smoking, (2) cigarette sales and advertising expenditures, and (3) consumer
reactions and the probable impact of cigarette advertising on consumers. FTC State-
ment of Basis 8371-72. As to the first, the Commission simply accepted the determina-
tion of the Surgeon General that smoking was a serious health hazard. The Com-
mission evidently regards this issue as involving "legislative facts," which need not be
litigated in any future adjudication. The second area comprises general "background
facts" which it states need not be litigated because they are not in controversy. Facts
in the third area are also regarded as "legislative" on the basis of the Commission's
argument that it is not concerned with particular advertisements, but is drawing on its"specialized knowledge and experience of marketing practices and consumer reaction."
Id. 8372.
No real difficulty results from such a treatment of the second class of facts, which
is not a matter of controversy-nor of particular importance. But the classification
of both of the other issues as "legislative" seems rather arbitrary. It is not at all clear
what makes these facts "legislative" and subject to determination by nonadjudicative
methods such as official notice, other than the fact that, as the Commission describes
them, they appear to have a generality extending beyond the particular case. This
does not necessarily provide a sufficient basis for official notice, or other nonadjudicative
determination. On the official notice issue generally, see Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362
F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1966) ; 2 K. DAvis, ADMirNISTRATv LAw TREATisE § 15.03 (1958).
as On the use of "accumulated knowledge" the Commission relies in part on Manco
Watch Strap Co., 60 F.T.C. 495 (1962). One cannot contest the proposition that an
agency may rely on experience and knowledge gained through repeated, past deter-
minations, see Brite Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 347 F2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1965); cf. Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), but it is questionable whether this is
quite as broad a license as the FTC seems to believe. See Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362
F2d 180 (6th Cir. 1966).
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conclusion that in all these cases it could take official notice or otherwise
rely on extra-record information is correct, it still would not validate
the promulgation of conclusive, irrebuttable rules. Yet, as earlier
noted,3 9 it appears to be the Commission's intent to make its trade
regulation rules final and conclusive. Of course, the rules expressly
allow any person subject to the rule an opportunity to show either that
conditions have so changed or that special circumstances now exist to
justify waiver of the rule,40 but this is not the same as permitting a
challenge to the rule itself. For example, the Commission's proposed
cigarette advertising rule 41 would require all cigarette advertising to be
accompanied by a warning of the health hazards of smoking. Pre-
sumably the Commission would permit a particular cigarette manu-
facturer in a cease and desist proceeding to show that its cigarettes are
unique and not a health hazard. But, if this interpretation of the
effect of trade regulation rules is correct, the Commission would not
allow evidence to be introduced for the purpose of challenging the
basic findings of the Surgeon General that smoking generally is a health
hazard. And if it does not, the rule would establish a degree of finality
beyond that which could be achieved by official notice, since section 7
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ' specifically requires, in
accordance with previous decisions of the Supreme Court,43 that when
an agency decision rests on official notice, the parties be given an
opportunity to contradict the facts officially noticed. Attempting to
avoid this requirement, the validity of which its own decisions recog-
nize,4 the Commission states that it "malkes little sense" in cases
involving "non-evidentiary facts" (a term it uses interchangeably with
"legislative facts") .4  But neither the APA nor Supreme Court de-
cisions support any such proposition. Indeed, since it is generally said
that only "legislative" facts can be noticed,46 the Commission's argu-
ment is tantamount to saying that rebuttal is never necessary. Some
have argued for refusing to allow rebuttal in the case of more limited
judicial notice,4' but even this suggestion has been justly criticized.
4 8
3 9 See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
4029 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964). See also FTC Statement of Basis 8372-73; 16
C.F.R. § 1.12(c) (1969).
41 See note 27 .supra.
425 U.S.C. § 556(e) (Supp. IV 1969).
43 E.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1937).
4 4 See Manco Watch Strap Co., 60 F.T.C. 495, 510-15 (1962); Beatrice Foods
Co., Ad. L. Dec. 2d 85, 89 (FTC 1966).
45 FTC Statement of Basis 8372.
46 E.g., Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F2d 180, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1966). See generally
2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958).
47 See McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore
Controversy, 14 VAND. L. REv. 779 (1961).
48 See 2 K. DAvis, ADmmiSTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 15.09 (Supp. 1965).
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In any event, the rule concerning official notice by agencies is quite
clearly to the contrary.4 9 The only tenable basis for disallowing re-
buttal of official notice which is consistent with present law is that in
certain cases the facts noticed are so irrefutable that attempted rebuttal
would be frivolous. However, this could surely not be said of the
trade regulation rules.
In summary, the Commission's effort to establish that substantive
rulemaking authority is inherent in its adjudicatory functions and au-
thority falls short of the mark. Adjudication may, as the Commission
points out, involve formulation of policy standards and "rules," but
it does not follow that because the agency must perforce make such
"rules" in the course of adjudication that it can legislate them outside
of the adjudicatory process. The Commission's argument in support
of rulemaking is based less on a solid case of actual authority than on
an implicit conclusion that rulemaking procedures are inherently a
preferable mode of policy formulation.50 The soundness of the Com-
mission's appraisal of the virtues of rulemaking is discussed later."'
Here it need only be noted that the mere fact that the agency deems
certain procedures desirable does not mean that it possesses the author-
ity to employ them.' Congress may well have its reasons for insisting
that the FTC formulate policy only in the form of essentially judicial,
as opposed to legislative, procedures, regardless of the powers given to
other agencies endowed with broader regulatory mandates.
C. The Limits of Rulemaking: The Blocked
Space Case and Beyond
On January 23, 1964, the Civil Aeronautics Board published a
notice of proposed rulemaking dealing principally with certain amend-
ments to regulations governing airline charter trips. Included in the
notice was an unrelated proposal to amend the Board's Statements of
General Policy to state that the Board would permit all-cargo carriers
to sell blocked space at wholesale rates to combination carriers. 53
49 E.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (Supp. IV 1969);
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1937).
50 In this regard it is noteworthy that over a third of the Commission's argument
in support of the "lawfulness of the trade regulation procedure" is devoted to a highly
abstract discussion of the general advantages of rulemaking procedure over adjudica-
tion in the formulation of agency policy. FTC Statement of Basis 8365-73.
5 1 Text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
5 2 See CAB v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316, 322 (1961), in which the Court,
invalidating the CAB's modification of an airline certificate without a hearing, noted:
[P]etitioners have argued at length that the Board's present procedure is a
happy resolution of conflicting interests. However, the fact is that the Board is
entirely a creature of Congress and the determinative question is not what
the Board thinks it should do but what Congress has said it can do.
53 14 C.F.R. §§ 207, 399 (1964) ; 29 Fed. Reg. 1476 (1964).
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Although the original proposal was ostensibly intended merely to
encourage combination carriers to make use of all-cargo carriers, the
Board subsequently stated that it would hear argument on whether
the all-cargo carriers should be permitted to sell blocked space to air
freight forwarders and other large volume shippers in addition to
combination carriers.5
4
In the interim, between notice of the argument and the final de-
cision of the Board, Slick Airlines, one of the all-cargo carriers, filed
a blocked space tariff. Thereafter, a competing all cargo-carrier and
three combination carriers filed complaints asking that Slick's tariff be
suspended. At the same time, each of the three combination carriers
filed defensive tariffs. The initial reaction of the Board was to suspend
all of the blocked space tariffs." Shortly thereafter, the Board not
only adopted its prior proposals to authorize sale of blocked space by
all-cargo carriers, but also made this an exclusive right, thereby fore-
closing combination carriers from selling blocked space."6 As a result
of the rulemaking, Slick's tariff became effective and the Board sum-
marily rejected the tariffs filed by the combination carriers."
On appeal, the combination carriers challenged the Board's action
on the ground that adoption of the blocked space rules amounted to a
modification of their rights under existing route certificates and was
unlawful absent the full adjudicatory hearing required by section
401 (g) of the Federal Aviation Act.-" The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit at first sustained the challenge by a vote
of 2 to l," but on rehearing en banc the court sustained the Board
5 to 3. 0
It seems quite clear that the Board's action granting to all-cargo
carriers exclusive rights to blocked space service did effect a modi-
fication of their certificates, and the court's opinion concedes as much.6'
Since on its face, section 4 01 (g) of the Act requires a full hearing
before certificate modification, the question was whether the Board, on
the strength of the Storer "doctrine," could avoid this requirement by
promulgating rules under section 4 of the APA.' Answering in the
5414 C.F.R. §§207, 399 (1964).
5 5 See Comment, The Ridemaking Procedure of the Civil Aeronautics Board:
The Blocked Space Service Problem, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 133, 134 (1966).
614 C.F.R. § 399 (1964).
6729 Fed. Reg. 11729 (1964).
5849 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1964).
69 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 17 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
60359 F2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). Throughout this
Article, American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB will be referred to as the Blocked Space case.
01 See 359 F2d at 628.
62 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. III, 1968). In light of the fact that neither the Board's
notice of proposed rulemaking nor its notice of oral argument gave notice of the policy
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affirmative, the court rejected the argument that both Storer and
Texaco were restricted to regulations affecting future applications for
new licenses, whereas the blocked space regulations modified existing
rights under existing certificates.63 To sustain the Board, the court
relied on the Supreme Court's NBC decision " and three lower court
decisions."
The court's reliance on NBC seems misplaced since the question
before the Court in that case involved the substantive power of the
FCC to adopt the rules (by any procedure) and the validity of the
rules themselves, 6 rather than whether the statute required a hearing.
Though the lower court decisions are relevant precedent, the circuit
court's opinion went beyond them in affirming the power of the CAB
to alter or affect rights and privileges by promulgating regulations in
lieu of adjudication,6 7 and established itself in the forefront of decisions
of restricting blocked space to all-cargo carriers, it is questionable whether the Board
did, in fact, comply with the requirements of § 4. See Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. United
States, 242 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ill. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 422 (1966).
The court evidently did not regard the adequacy of notice under § 4 as being con-
tested by the parties, since it states that "the procedure followed by the Board
admittedly complies fully with the requirements . .. in Section 4." 359 F2d at 626
(emphasis added). However, appellants did at one point in their briefs on rehearing
challenge the adequacy of notice. Brief for Petitioner at 11-12, American Airlines. Inc.
v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This point may have been subsequently
abandoned, although the same issue was raised again and argued at some length in the
petition for certiorari. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 32-36, American Airlines
v. CAB, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
63American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
64 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
C5Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Capitol Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 292 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
6The Court in NBC indicates that the rules were promulgated after public
hearings and that there was no ground for procedural challenge. 319 U.S. at 194-95,
225. In American Airlines the Court states that these hearings were not the hearings
required in adjudication, but were "legislative hearings," and therefore, the Supreme
Court's statement that there was no basis for claim that the Commission there failed
to observe procedural claims is pertinent to the CAB's procedure. 359 F2d at 628 n.12.
But it is not clear how the court reaches this conclusion about the hearings in
NBC. Though it was argued in NBC that the hearings conducted did not satisfy
the requirement of a "full hearing," Brief for Appellant CBS at 97-103; Brief for
Appellant NBC at 88-89, NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), the Govern-
ment demonstrated that virtually all of the prerequisites of an adjudicatory hearing
were in fact, if not in name, accorded the parties. See Brief for Appellees at 121-37,
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). This appears to be the conclusion of the
district court, see NBC v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940, 945, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
and that of the Supreme Court. 319 U.S. at 225.
7That these cases in some manner affirmed agency use of rulemaking in some-
what similar circumstances cannot be disputed. Several of the cases are so similar
that it may seem mere cavil to indulge in an extensive discussion to point out the
features of these cases which distinguish them from the Blocked Space case. However,
in order to dispel any impression that the Blocked Space case is nothing more than
another application of well-established precedent, some distinguishing factors should be
noted. In Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the
FCC changed the frequency (and thereby a condition or "right") of an existing station,
but made the change effective only upon the expiration of its current license term,
thereby making the changed frequency a condition of the grant of a future renewal
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in this area.6 8
The full extent of the rulemaking power confirmed by the Blocked
Space opinion is not clear. What, if any, are the limitations on the
use of rulemaking proceedings to foreclose issues from future contest
in adjudicatory proceedings? The court suggests some limit on the
use of rulemaking by observing that:
license to the station. This would appear to fall within the parameters of Storer:
laying down conditions for future licensing, rather than modifications of an existing
license. Another distinction can be drawn on the basis of the renewable broadcast
licenses under the Communications Act and the "permanent" nature of air carrier
certificates under the Federal Aviation Act. The very concept of renewable rights
suggests a "right" or "privilege" which is less fixed than the air carrier certificate
and one more subject to the vicissitudes of changed conditions. The court made it
clear in Transconthient that a licensee is not on the same footing as a certificate holder.
In Capitol Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 292 F2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the Board had
promulgated regulations authorizing air carriers, including "supplemental" carriers,
to perform certain services for the military, whether or not these services were included
-within their preexisting operating authority. This authorization, effected by exempting
the carriers from the certification procedures of the Act, contained an expiration date
of September 30, 1960. Prior to the expiration date the Board instituted a rulemaking
proceeding looking towards terminating the "blanket exemption" previously given and
replacing it with a procedure for individual exemptions. Petitioners, supplemental air
carriers, opposed the repeal of the blanket exemption regulations and at the same time
sought renewal of their exemption. Taking no action on their renewal requests, the
Board allowed the licenses to lapse on the termination date. The petitioners argued
in vain that they had been denied a right to a hearing on the ground that the original
regulations had given them, in effect, a license to engage in operations for the military
which the Board could not suspend or modify without a hearing. The court's rejection
of this argument in Capitol Airways does not seem particularly surprising, since the
supplemental carriers were clearly attempting to build their procedural castle out of
sand. The first step in their argument-that they had license rights-is tenuous to
begin with, but the second step-that given a license with all its attendant privileges,
the license could not be allowed to expire by its own terms-is much less persuasive
than the argument for a hearing in Transcontinent where the renewal of licenses was
accepted as a routine part of the procedural framework.
The Second Circuit in Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961), upheld the promulgation of an FAA regulation
barring individuals sixty years old from serving as pilots, the effect of which was
to modify or terminate existing pilot licenses without a hearing. However, the pilot
licenses as originally issued provided that their duration was as set out in current
regulations. Thus the license rights were conditioned at the outset by being subject
to future rulemaking. Moreover, in view of the large number of persons involved, a
full evidentiary hearing was not a practical possibility, as the court emphasized. 276
F.2d at 896. The same factor is prominent in many (though not all) of the more
recent cases affirming a broad use of rulemaking power. See, e.g., California Citizens
Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F2d 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967)
(rules affecting over 800,000 citizens band radio licensees) ; Conley Electronics Corp.
v. FCC, 394 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1968) (several thousand CATV systems). This
could hardly be said of the blocked space rules, because the total number of certificated
airlines is very limited, and the number of carriers affected by the blocked space rules
is even more limited. See Regular Common Carrier Conf. v. United States, 26 Ad.
L. Dec. 2d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 1969); 1968 CAB ANN. REP. 18 (listing only 18 carriers
with cargo ratings).
68 Many other recent cases have affirmed the use of rulemaking, but no new
principles have been developed since American Airlines. See cases cited note 67 supra.
See also Pacific Coast European Conf. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n., 376 F2d 785
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1966), aff'd, 369
F.2d 404 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967). On the strength of Storer,
Texaco, and subsequent lower court decisions, Professor Fuchs concludes that "past
zealousness to guard a licensee from having his license modified by rules when the
statute required a hearing has only a lingering force." Fuchs, The New Administrative
State: Judicial Sanction for Agency Self-Determination in the Regulation of Industry,
69 CoLum. L. REv. 216, 227 (1969).
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We are not here concerned with a proceeding that in form
is couched as rule making, general in scope and prospective
in operation, but in substance and effect is individual in
impact and condemnatory in purpose. The proceeding before
us is rule making both in form and effect. There is no
individual action here masquerading as a general rule. We
have no basis for supposing that the Board's regulation was
based on a sham rather than a genuine classification. The
classes of carriers were analyzed both functionally and in
terms of capacity for furthering the promotional purposes of
the Act.0 9
This implies that rulemaking would be improper if it were "individual
in impact and condemnatory in purpose," or if it were based on a
"sham" classification. A very literal interpretation suggests that only
those proceedings in which the Board (1) intended to single out indi-
vidual carriers for the imposition of some sanction, or (2) created
phony classifications with no valid regulatory purpose, lie outside the
proper sphere of rulemaking. The first limitation seems nearly mean-
ingless, since the only types of proceedings which would be clearly out-
side the proper sphere of rulemaking would be insignificant cases in-
volving the specific imposition of penalties or enforcement of sanctions
for violation of the Act or the Board's rules. It is hard to believe that
the court intended that the limitation be read quite so literally, though
the opinion elsewhere suggests that this may have been its intent.'"
Approached more realistically, the significant criterion is not whether a
proceeding involves some condemnation or enforcement of the statute or
rules, but simply whether a proceeding is "individual in impact." But
even this more restrictive interpretation raises questions. What kinds
of proceedings are "individual in impact"? Is this simply a question of
the number of parties affected or must the rule have a unique impact on
each affected individual? In Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. Boyd,71 decided
just before the Blocked Space case, the district court upheld CAB rules
69 359 F2d at 631.
71o The court's reliance on Capitol Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 292 F2d 755, 758 (D.C.
Cir. 1961), in which the court distinguished a prior decision requiring a hearing on the
ground that "the impact of the Board's decision is on an entire class, rather than on
particular members of the class who are singled out as law violators or labeled for some
reason as unfit or unworthy," suggests that the narrower reading of the language may
be correct. Judge Burger notes in his dissent "great difficulty in understanding why
licensees not accused of violating the law are not as much entitled to an adjudicatory
hearing as licensees who are so accused, when the two are subjected to equivalent
Board action," 359 F2d at 636.
71244 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1965). See also Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 251 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959) (upholding administrative action where the
"impact of the determination is upon the group, not upon individuals"); Regular
Common Carrier Conf. v. United States, 26 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 1969).
The leading constitutional decision, drawing this distinction, is, of course, BiMetallic
Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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limiting the off-route charter operations of all-cargo air carriers. Re-
jecting the contention that the absence of an adjudicatory hearing made
the rulemaking improper, the court held that rulemaking was proper
"if the impact of a ruling or decision of the Board affects an entire
class, rather than particular members of a group." 72 No mention was
made of the fact that the "entire class" in this case numbered only five
carriers, 73 a fact which could not have escaped notice. This suggests
that the size of the class is not itself significant if the rule does not on
its face discriminate among the individual members. The second limi-
tation, that the classification not be a "sham," seems as a practical
matter unimportant, since an agency seemingly would have almost
unlimited discretion to define the relevant "class." Conceivably it
might even promulgate a "rule" directed at a "class" comprised of only
one party if the designation of the class was made without a discrim-
inatory purpose. Suppose, for example, that instead of attempting to
refuse to renew Northeast Airline's New York-Miami certificate by
adjudication,7 4 the CAB had promulgated a policy "rule" to the effect
that in this market no more than two carriers should be certificated and,
because of the need to have a carrier with a strong seasonal market,
no carrier without other substantial long-haul routes (which Northeast
did not have) should be authorized to serve or continue service in
the market.
We might expect that in this situation where the rule promulgated
is so obviously directed at an individual, in fact if not in name, that
the court would draw a line between valid and invalid rulemaking
procedures, similar to that drawn in Philadelphia Co. v. SEC.73 In
Philadelphia Co., the SEC had promulgated rules under the Public
Utility Holding Act exempting certain subsidiaries of registered hold-
ing companies from specific provisions of the Act. Subsequently, the
Commission promulgated, without an "adequate" adjudicatory hearing,
an amendment to the exemption rule which had the effect of revoking
the exemption of the Philadelphia Company's subsidiaries. Although
the amendment was couched in general form, the Commission acknowl-
edged that the basis for the rule concerned "primarily the situation
which has been presented by the Philadelphia Company and its sub-
sidiaries." 7" The court held the revocation of the Philadelphia Com-
pany's exemption invalid on the ground that the fifth amendment, the
72 244 F. Supp. at 892.
73 See 1965 CAB ANx. REP., at app., Chart of Certified Cargo Carriers.
74 See Northeast Airlines v. CAB, 331 F2d 579 (1st Cir. 1964); 345 F2d 484
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 845 (1965) ; Reopened New York-Florida Renewal
Case, 2 CCH, Av. L. REP. f21700 (CAB 1967).
75 175 F2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1949).
76 175 F2d at 813.
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Act, and the Commission's own rules required a "quasi-judicial hear-
ing" for "adjudicatory action," a label which the court applied to the
Commission's action on the ground that it was "particular and im-
mediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rulemaking action
general and future in effect." '7 Whether Philadelphia Co. still remains
a viable precedent for declaring rulemaking which is focused specif-
ically on a particular individual to be invalid is uncertain. The case
involved a rule which was "individual in impact," but it does not seem
to meet the criterion stated in the Blocked Space opinion, "condem-
natory in purpose," and it is hard to say that the classification there
was a "sham."
Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC 7 also raises some doubt
about the continued vitality of Philadelphia Co. The deintermixture
controversy involved in Transcontinent will be explored in detail later.7"
It is sufficient here to note that in 1956 the Federal Communications
Commission proposed a long range policy designed to shift all television
channels eventually to the UHF band. To effectuate its long range
goal, the Commission formulated and adopted an interim policy which
proposed immediate "deintermixture" of VHF and UHF in certain
markets, generally by making the particular markets all-UHF. Several
of these markets were subsequently made all-UHF, and in 1960 the
Commission proposed deintermixture of Bakersfield, California. Fol-
lowing rulemaking proceedings, the deintermixture of Bakersfield was
ordered by substituting two UHF channels for the existing VHF
channel. 0 Without an adjudicatory hearing on the issue of deinter-
mixture, the Commission ordered the licensee of the only VHF station
in the market to convert its operation to a UHF channel. The order
was not made effective, however, until the expiration of the licensee's
existing license. On appeal the licensee objected that the order de-
prived it of the adjudicatory hearing required by two different sections
of the Communications Act. 81 Conceding that the Commission might
employ rulemaking proceedings to allocate frequencies generally,ss the
licensee contended it could not do so where the allocation changed the
frequency of an existing station. The licensee also argued that even
if the Commission could change existing frequencies pursuant to a
77 175 F2d at 816; cf., American Export Isbrandtsen Lines v. FMC, 389 F2d 962,
968 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
78308 F2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
'79 Text accompanying notes 180-96 infra.
80 Deintermixture of Bakersfield Area, 21 P & F RADio REG. 155:606 (1961),
aff'd sub norn., Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
8147 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1964) (provides for hearing when Commission desires to
change a station's frequencies, power, or hours of operation); id. § 316(a) (provides
for hearing as a prerequisite to modification of a station license).
82 E.g., Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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general deintermixture proceeding involving numerous stations, it could
not do so here where the proceeding was specifically directed at a
single licensee.3 The court did not squarely meet this argument, but
upheld the Commission on the ground that the order was made effective
only at the expiration of the current license period and was therefore
not a modification of a license or a change in the station's frequency
to which the hearing provisions of the Act applied since, as of the
effective date of the order, no license was outstanding.84 Trans-
continent illustrates the extent to which rulemaking has been employed
to resolve very particularized controversies. At the same time, since
the court in these circumstances avoided stating any conclusion regard-
ing the legal limits on the use of legislative type proceedings in dis-
posing of individual cases, it is not possible to predict what limits,
if any, there might be.
In contrast to the approach suggested by the above cases of at-
tempting to determine whether a proceeding is essentially legislative
or adjudicative in character, Professor Davis has articulated an ap-
proach based on whether or not the particular issues in the case involve
"legislative facts," which may be determined on the basis of the agency's
general knowledge or through nonadjudicative methods, or "adjudi-
cative facts," which require a trial-type hearing." This distinction
parallels that which he draws for the purpose of defining the per-
missible use of official notice, and which in turn was used by the FTC
to support its rulemaking authority. Of course, this formulation
leaves open the difficult question how to determine what is an adjudi-
cative fact and what is a legislative fact. Davis describes the former
as facts about the "parties and their activities, businesses, and proper-
ties" whereas the latter "do not usually concern the immediate parties
but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law
and policy and discretion." 86 Though this distinction may be helpful
in some cases, as a general guide it is, as Professor Nathanson has
put it,87 "as elusive as all the other magic keys which have been offered"
to solve the right to hearing issue. It is at least susceptible to
semantic manipulation to achieve the result desired in any particular
case. Consider, for example, the deintermixture issue involved in
Transcontinent. On the one hand, the issue could be stated broadly-
83 Brief for Appellant at 39-48, Trancontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F2d
339 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
84 308 F.2d at 344. See also WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 619
(2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.); Goodwill Stations v. FCC, 325 F,2d 637 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
85 1 K. DAvis, ADmINiSTRATm LAW TREATISE § 7.02 (1958).
86d.
87 Nathanson, Book Review, 70 YALE LJ. 1210, 1211 (1961).
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whether deintermixture is a sound policy, which might be characterized
as involving "general facts" and could thus justify the Commission's
refusal to accord an evidentiary hearing on the wisdom of deinter-
mixture. On the other hand, it is equally simple and logical to char-
acterize the issues more specifically-whether the presence of a VHF
station in the Bakersfield market is an impediment to the vitality and
growth of UHF stations in this market; whether the substitution of a
UHF channel for a VHF channel would eliminate this impediment;
and whether a UHF channel in lieu of a VHF channel would provide
adequate service or would lead to reduction of service. If the broad
issue is broken down into such narrow questions, the general "legis-
lative" issue of deintermixture dissolves into a series of discrete in-
quiries involving the "immediate parties" and their particular "activi-
ties, businesses and properties." 88
In light of the difficulty of definition in such cases one wonders
whether it is worthwhile to attempt to resolve the problem satisfactorily
in terms of general characterization. Would it not be more realistic
to rest the choice of procedure issue on a pragmatic determination
whether, and to what extent, particular procedures-be they "adjudi-
catory" or "rulemaking" procedures-are appropriate to the resolution
of the issue in a particular type of case, both in terms of effective
resolution of the policy issues and of fairness to the parties?
There is language in the Blocked Space opinion which suggests
an endorsement of a pragmatic and flexible approach to the problem
of determining the appropriate procedure. At one point the court
emphasizes that upon a showing of specific need it might have con-
sidered "additional procedural safeguards" as part of a rulemaking
proceeding (as opposed to requiring a full adjudicatory hearing).s9
However, it- concluded:
We might view the case differently if we were not confronted
solely with a broad conceptual demand for an adjudicatory-
type proceeding, which is at least consistent with, though we
do not say it is attributable to, a desire for protracted delay.
Nowhere in the record is there any specific proffer by peti-
titioners as to the subjects they believed required oral hear-
ings, what kinds of facts they proposed to adduce, and by what
witnesses, etc. Nor was there any specific proffer as to
particular lines of cross-examination which required explora-
tion at an oral hearing.9O
S8 Nathanson offers a somewhat similar illustration of the ambiguity of the dis-
tinction. See id.
89 359 F2d at 632.
90 Id. at 632-33.
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The court's rejection of "conceptual demands" for adjudicatory
proceeding and its insistence on some showing of need for adjudicatory
processes evidences a wisely pragmatic approach which must be warmly
endorsed. Yet, the opinion when read in its entirety raises doubts
whether the court is as fully committed to an open, pragmatic approach
as the statement quoted above indicates, or whether its rejection of
petitioners' "conceptual demands" is not based in significant part on
its own doctrinal commitment to the concept of rulemaking procedures
as the preferred technique of policy formulation. Though the court
invites the parties to show in what respects they require additional
procedural safeguards, it assumes that the overall framework of the
proceeding should be rulemaking because of its "flexibility" and because
of the general conclusion drawn by the court that the issues were not
suitable for adjudication.
The particular point most controverted by petitioners is the
effect of the CAB regulation on their business. The issue
involves what Professor Davis calls "legislative" rather than
"adjudicative" facts. It is the kind of issue involving expert
opinions and forecasts, which cannot be decisively resolved by
testimony. It is the kind of issue where a month of ex-
perience will be worth a year of hearings."
This is painting with a rather broad brush. Even if it were possible
to define "legislative fact" adequately, it seems conceptualistic to con-
clude flatly that such facts cannot be "decisively resolved by testimony"
(as if almost any fact could be) and that adjudication is not, therefore,
a suitable vehicle for their determination, whereas rulemaking is. The
preoccupation of the court with the "unique value" of rulemaking pro-
cedures is evident throughout its opinion.2 It is ironic that in this
attachment to abstract generalization, the court chose to characterize
petitioners' demands for a hearing as too "conceptual." 13
There are, of course, advantages in promulgating general regu-
latory policies in rulemaking proceedings. Certainly agencies should
91 Id.
92
Rulemaking has a unique value and importance as an administrative tech-
nique for evolution of general policy, notwithstanding, or perhaps indeed
because of, the freedom from the procedures carefully prescribed to assure
fairness in individual adjudication.
359 F.2d at 630.
93 Mr. Howard Westwood, counsel for American Airlines in its unsuccessful at-
tempt to seek Supreme Court review by certiorari has observed of the court's opinion:
"[I]t becomes preoccupied with the concept of rule-making, and a distinction between
rule-making and adjudication, and . . . gets all bogged down in semantics." Sym-
posium, Reflections on the Conduct of an Administrative Hearing, 20 AD. L. REv. 101,
139 (1967).
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attempt to articulate some general policies and standards to provide
guidance for interested persons and to establish a framework for their
own actions." Rulemaking procedures are often the most appropriate
vehicle for the formulation of such policies. But these modest proposi-
tions are far removed from the sweeping generalizations for which the
Blocked Space court showed such a penchant. It is unfortunate that the
court there was not content with holding that in that case the parties
had not shown a substantial need for, or prejudice in being denied, the
full panoply of hearing prerequisites. Limited to this narrow but solid
rationale the court's decision provides a valuable precedent for ap-
proaching this problem in future cases, but the court's gratuitous pro-
nouncements on the "unique virtues" of rulemaking and its inherent
superiority as a tool of policy-making should be viewed with a sharply
critical and skeptical eye.
II. THE PROCEDURAL PARADIGM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING
In his widely heralded memorandum on the Civil Aeronautics
Board, Louis Hector passed harsh judgment on the manner in which
the Board performed its policy-making functionsY A chief cause of
the Board's "appalling inefficiency" in policy-making, according to
his analysis, lies in the use of formalized procedures to accomplish
functions for which they are ill-suited. The Board's use of such
cumbersome methods is in marked contrast to Mr. Hector's idea of how
''a well-run Government agency or military command or business"
would handle such tasks." Whatever may be said of Hector's criticism
of the particular procedures and performance of the CAB, it is difficult
to accept his contrasting examples of the military command and busi-
ness management as obvious models for the Board or any agency to
emulate.
Hector's commendation of the military as an example for the
CAB and others is particularly arresting. If one is to judge by the
end result, it is not the CAB which suffers in comparison with the
military. In terms of efficiency, the shortcomings of the Board which
Hector identifies in the area of route planning, for example, seem fully
matched by the many dismal results of military procurement policies.
9 7
In terms of efficiency or responsiveness to the interests and needs of the
04 See generally, H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962)
90 Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions,
69 YALE L. J. 931 (1960).
D6 Id. 932-34.
9 7 The Cheyenne Helicopter, the Shillelagh Missile System, and CSA Transport
illustrate the point. All are reviewed briefly in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Government Operations on H.R. 474, pt. 5, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969).
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general public, even Mr. Hector would, I think, be hard pressed to
show that the operations of the Army Corps of Engineers inspire
greater confidence than those of the CAB.""
Hector's business model is a somewhat more plausible alternative.
Others too have urged that where-in the case of the CAB, for
example-economic planning is involved, policy problems ought to be
approached in the same way that business executives make policy.9 It
is hard to appraise this view analytically since it is invariably offered
more as an abstract, undefined ideal than as a specific program for
action. On an abstract level, about all that can be said about it is that
it is far from self-evident why it should be regarded as ideal. Again,
judging by results, there is little to justify implicit faith in the efficacy
of executive planning. Even a casual view of the business world, with
its recurrent insolvencies and lesser failures, raises doubts about this
model. The CAB might, as Hector asserts, 10 have devised more
efficient and expeditious procedures for formulating regulatory policy
for local service carriers than it did in the Seven States Area Investi-
gation."1' But looking at the performance of some of the carriers
themselves up to that time, it is hard to chide the Board for not model-
ing its own planning methods-involving policies far more complex
than those confronting any airline management-after theirs. Nor has
the adoption of executive methods by government demonstrated obvious
superiority over other methods, as the questionable handling to date
of the SST program suggests.'
These doubts about the choice of executive management methods
as a model for administrative planning do not imply that many plan-
ning functions now given to administrative agencies might not be
better performed if they were returned to private management. On
the contrary, persuasive reasons are evident in many areas now under
administrative regulation for shifting responsibility for planning to the
98 The reference here is to the civil functions of the Corps. For a very critical
study, see A. MAAss, MUDDY WATERS, THE ARMy ENGINEERS AND THE NATION'S
RIVEs (1951). The foreword by former Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes is
especially devastating.
It must be admitted that the Corps is a rather distinctive kind of military agency
since the civil functions of the Corps are only nominally controlled by the Secretary of
Defense or the Army. Congress and the Corps itself have long regarded the Corps as
more an arm of Congress. Id. 132-33.
99 E.g., 3. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
17 (1960).
100 Hector, supra note 95, at 932-34.
10128 C.A.B. 680, anended, 28 C.A.B. 955 (1959), aff'd Mb norn. North Central
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 281 F2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
102 On the program generally, see Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Appropriations, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
1970, pt. 3, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). A critical, and generally unfavorable, ap-
praisal of the program and its putative justifications, is given in the report of President
Nixon's Ad Hoc Review Committee, id. 318-48.
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private sector.103 However, this suggestion is based on a belief that,
in such areas, the operation of the market as a whole would work
better than government planning; it does not in any way signify that
the methods of individual management decision-making are in them-
selves uniquely efficacious, or particularly suited to the tasks of broad
social and economic planning. Nevertheless, all this is of little rele-
vance to the present commentary in which it is assumed that adminis-
trative planning has been instituted to take account of public interests
for which it is presumed (though not necessarily by this author) that
neither private decision-making nor unregulated market forces generally
are adequate. On this premise, the search for appropriate forms for
administrative planning is not notably advanced by simplistic reliance
on the methods employed in the private sector. In the last analysis,
then, we return to Mr. Hector's first alternative, the "well-run Govern-
ment agency," to see what, if any, generalizations can be made about
this mythical beast and its policy-making tasks.
A. Agency Discretion in the Choice of Procedure
Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the manner in which most
agencies have performed (or not performed) their policy-making func-
tions, it has been accepted that the choice of procedures is nevertheless
one primarily for the agency itself to make. As stated in the second
Chenery case,104 "the choice made between proceeding by general rule
or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the in-
formed discretion of the administrative agency." Such limits as were
placed by the courts on the agency's discretion primarily limited the
use of rulemaking in particular controversies where an adjudicative
hearing was mandated. As noted earlier, these limits have become
almost useless as the rulemaking power has been expanded. At the
same time, limits on the use of adjudication have been virtually non-
existent. Despite constant exhortation by courts and commentators to
employ rulemaking procedures, 10 5 and despite occasional warnings 106
103 This, of course, is an ancient sentiment, though it appears to be experiencing
a rejuvenescence in recent years. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISMs AND FREmom
(1962). For a very broad, general perspective on such matters, see R. DAHL &
C. LINDBLOM, PoUiTics, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE (1953), especially pts. IV and V.
104 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
105 See, e.g., id. at 202; NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F2d 854, 860 (2d
Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.) ; authorities cited note 6 supra. In 1963 the American Bar
Association Section on Administrative Law adopted a resolution urging that agencies
should "(1) 'as fixed' policy prefer and use rule making to reduce case-by-case adjudi-
cation, (2) codify established precedent, and (3) promulgate as rules or statements
of policy any general principles enumerated in specific cases." Fisher, Rulemaking
Activities in Federal Administrative Agencies, 17 AD. L. REv. 252 (1965).
106 See, e.g., Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 754-55 (1961); 1 DAVIS, ADMINISRATIvE LAW
§ 6.13 (Supp. 1967).
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that the formulation of general policy rules by adjudication might
violate the notice and participation requirements of section 4 of the
APA,0 7 nothing compelled the agencies to proceed in the manner pre-
scribed by section 4 where the agency chose to make its rules as an
incident to adjudication of individual cases.
However, this situation may now be changed by NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co.,' in which a majority of the Supreme Court dis-
approved the practice of the NLRB of promulgating rules through
individual case adjudications without complying with the provisions of
section 4 of the APA. Wyman-Gordon arose out of an effort by the
Board to enforce an order based on its so-called "Excelsior rule" which
required employers, prior to representation elections, to furnish unions
with a list of the names and addresses of all employees eligible to
vote in the election. The rule had been laid down in a prior decision
in Excelsior Underwear Inc.,' in which unions who lost representation
elections in two companies sought to have the elections set aside on
the ground that the companies had denied to the unions a list of names
and addresses of eligible employee voters. In the course of the Ex-
celsior proceeding, the Board invited various employer groups and trade
unions to file amici curiae briefs and participate in oral argument.
After these proceedings the Board laid down a general rule that such
a list be provided, but it declined to apply this new rule to the com-
panies involved in the Excelsior case. In Wyman-Gordon, the Board,
relying on its Excelsior rule, ordered respondent company to furnish
a list of eligible employee voters prior to an election in which two
unions were competing for representation of the respondent's employees.
The Board then invalidated the election because of the employer's
refusal to furnish the list and again ordered that it be provided. In
a subsequent proceeding to enforce production of the list, the district
court directed compliance with the Board's order."' The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,"' holding the order
invalid because it was based on a rule which had not been promulgated
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme
Court in turn reversed, holding that the order was valid. At the
same time, however, Justice Fortas' opinion for a plurality of the
Court expressly disapproved the Board's practice in promulgating the
Excelsior rule as an incident of an individual adjudication without
107 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. III, 1965-67).
108 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
109 156 N.L.RB. 1236 (1966).
110 270 F. Supp. 280 (D. Mass. 1967).
11 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968).
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compliance with the requirements of section 4 of the APA, even though
it concluded that the order itself was separable and valid irrespective of
the invalidity of the rule on which it was based." 2  In a concurring
opinion, Justice Black, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed
that the order was valid but disagreed with the conclusion that the
rule involved and the Board's practice of promulgating rules in the
process of adjudicating cases were improper. 113  In two separate dis-
sents Justices Harlan and Douglas thought that both the order and
the rule were invalid." 4 Thus, although the Board's order was upheld,
six Justices regarded the Board's practice of promulgating general
rules in individual adjudicated cases as improper. Indeed, even Justice
Black's opinion intimates that the Board's procedure might be improper
under some circumstances." 5  The basis for identifying the Excelsior
case as rulemaking rather than adjudication is not fully developed.
However, the opinions of Justices Fortas, Harlan, and Douglas all give
very large importance to the fact that the Board applied the Excelsior
requirement prospectively.
Whether there are any other criteria for identifying a proceeding
as "rulemaking" is not indicated. In this regard it is interesting to
note the parallel between Wyman-Gordon and the Storer-Blocked Space
line of cases discussed earlier. In the latter cases the central issue was,
of course, whether the proceeding (or the issues involved) was of such
a character that an agency may proceed by rulemaking notwithstanding
the impact on individuals. In Wyman-Gordon a parallel issue exists-
whether the proceeding (or the issues involved) is of such a character
that the agency must proceed by rulemaking. The question which at
once arises is whether these two issues are two sides of the same coin:
Is every proceeding or issue which, by virtue of its general character,
is appropriate for rulemaking under Storer and its progeny also one
for which rulemaking is mandatory under Wyman-Gordon? An
affirmative answer would, of course, virtually overrule the principle of
administrative discretion established in the second Chenery case."'
However, none of the opinions in Wyman-Gordon can be read to sup-
port such a drastic curtailment of agency discretion.
Appropriate use of adjudication is clearly recognized in Justice
Fortas' opinion:
112 394 U.S. at 766.
113 Id. at 769.
14 Id. at 775, 780.
115 Justice Black concedes that the Board would not be free to promulgate policy
rules in adjudication where they were not adopted as an "incident" to the decision of
a case before the agency, but he viewed the rule here as a "legitimate incident" of the
Board's decision in the case. Id. at 770.
116 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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Adjudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as
vehicles for the formulation of agency policies, which are
applied and announced therein. . . . They generally provide
a guide to action that the agency may be expected to take in
future cases. Subject to the qualified role of stare decisis in
the administrative process, they may serve as precedents.
But this is far from saying . . . that commands, decisions,
or policies announced in adjudication are "rules" in the sense
that they must, without more, be obeyed by the affected
public. 1
17
Justice Fortas, at least, thought that agencies would continue to have
discretion to develop policy through adjudication, at least where the
policy is "applied . . . therein." But, apart from the element of
prospective application, he offers no clear guide for when a judgment
of principle is to be deemed a rule and when it is not. The suggestion
that the principles established in a particular decision are not normally
"rules," because they are not obligatory on the general public, if taken
literally, is a strange criterion. When the Supreme Court laid down
its guidelines for police interrogation in Miranda,"8 were these not to
be "obeyed" in other cases falling within the guidelines but not yet
before the Court? The very term "obeyed," while perhaps appropriate
in the context of this particular NLRB rule, is a confusing, if not mis-
leading, qualification for agency decisions in other contexts. With
many administrative decisions, particularly in the area of economic
regulation, it is not so much a matter of obeying a decision or agency
pronouncement in the sense that one obeys a specific command as it is
a matter of relying on or adjusting one's business or conduct in
accordance with it. For example, the CAB might decide that it will
reject all tariffs for blocked space service filed by combination air
carriers. To say that this is a judgment which is to be "obeyed" by
both combination carriers and all-cargo carriers is only confusing.
Similarly, the FCC may adopt a policy that in a comparative licensing
proceeding between two or more broadcast license applicants, the ap-
plicant having no ownership interest in other communications media
shall be entitled to a preference over any applicant having such interests.
Again, it is not very useful to treat the action as a command to be
"obeyed" by all present and future license applicants. On the other
hand, it would not make much sense to exclude the policies adopted
in these situations from consideration in defining what constitutes a
"rule." To make the definition of a "rule" turn on whether the policy
is one which must be "obeyed" in a literal sense would create a senseless
distinction.
17 394 U.S. at 765-66.
118 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Justice Fortas's opinion need not be read so literally to compel such
distinctions. Wyman-Gordon can and should be analyzed and under-
stood primarily with reference to the particular practice of the NLRB
involved. The vice of the practice lies not in the fact that the Board
has used adjudication to develop labor relations policy; nor in the
fact that in particular cases principles have developed which go beyond
the immediate case and must in some sense be "obeyed" by other
parties. The real trouble, rather, lies in the fact that the Board has
not even purported to develop its policy rules as an incident to its liti-
gation of cases, but has virtually singled out individual cases as vehicles
in which to consider and promulgate general policy rules which are
largely independent of the facts and issues of the particular case. In
some instances, it may not be unfair to say that individual cases have
been manipulated or at least distorted for the ulterior ends of
rulemaking. n 9
On this premise the Court's disapproval of NLRB practice might
sensibly be interpreted to mean that general administrative policy can
be promulgated through adjudication (that is, without conforming to
the requirements of section 4) only if it is developed incidentally out
of the course of litigating particular cases. Such a holding would be
reasonably sound in principle. Even Justice Black, who would give
the agency very broad discretion, acknowledges that for an agency to
formulate policy rules by adjudication, the relationship between the
particular case and the rule being announced must be such that the
latter can be said to be "a legitimate incident to the adjudication of a
specific case before it." '2' However, it is to be noted that his definition
of a "legitimate incident" to adjudication seems far more permissive
than that of Justices Fortas, Douglas, or Harlan.
Nevertheless, though this rather narrow interpretation of TW/yman-
Gordon is defensible, it is undermined by the rather formalistic approach
of the Fortas, Douglas, and Harlan opinions, particularly in the strong,
if not conclusive, weight placed on the element of prospective application
as the earmark of a "rule" which must be formulated in conformity
with section 4 of the APA."2' Such a rigid and formalistic approach is
somewhat at odds with the Supreme Court's own practice of applying
219 See Peck, supra note 106. See also Peck, A Critique of the National Labor
Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule Making,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1968).
120 394 U.S. at 770.
1
211d. at 763-64 (Fortas, J.), at 776-77 (Douglas, J.), and at 780-81 (Harlan, J.).
Justice Black interprets Justice Fortas's opinion to give controlling weight to the
Board's making the rule prospective. Id. at 773. Compare City of Chicago v. FPC,
385 F2d 629, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1967) upholding an FPC policy change which was
prospectively applied from the date when the change was first announced.
[Voi.118:485
RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION
decisions prospectively.' " The failure to apply a rule to the adjudica-
tion in which it is formulated might be evidence of the fact that it was
not a "legitimate incident to the adjudication," but to treat it as con-
trolling would, as Justice Black points out, in effect require an agency
to proceed by adjudication "only when it could decide, prior to ad-
judicating a particular case, that any new practice to be adopted would
be applied retroactively." '-3 If an agency, after evaluating the argu-
ments and evidence, decides that it would be fairer to apply its de-
cisional policy prospectively, "it would be faced with the unpleasant
choice of either starting all over again . . . in a 'rule making' pro-
ceeding, or overriding the considerations of fairness and applying its
order retroactively anyway . .. 24
Even apart from distinctions based on whether a policy is prospec-
tive or retroactive, Wyman-Gordon still may enhance formalistic pre-
cepts in administrative law if it is understood, as it is likely to be,
as a general affirmation of rulemaking as the norm of administrative
policy formulation. This will not advance the cause of common sense
in administrative law. Too much preoccupation with the general forms
of agency proceedings already exists. It would be unfortunate if
Wyman-Gordon were to reinforce this preoccupation by forcing courts
to determine in every case in which they review an agency's deci-
sion whether that decision has the earmarks of rulemaking or of
adjudication.
In light of the ever increasing variety of administrative tasks,
problems, and correspondingly different interests and needs, courts
should be reluctant to focus too quickly on generalized precepts of
administrative procedure which may often be inapplicable to the indi-
vidual situations confronting particular agencies. The comments which
follow are an effort to reappraise some of the general pronouncements
on the uses of the rulemaking and adjudicative procedures in the mak-
ing of agency policy."2
B. Rulemaking and Adjudication: Some Critical Comments
It is not intended in this section to provide a detailed enumeration
and full examination of all of the respective virtues and vices of rule-
1 2 E.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). The practice of prospective
overruling is not confined to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Spanel v. Mounds View
School fist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Graham v. Rolandson, 435
P2d 263, 274 (Mont. 1967). The situations of the courts and agencies are not, of
course, completely identical, insofar as the latter are given specific rulemaking power
and the former are not.
1p2 394 U.S. at 774.
14 Id. at 774-75.
15 Note 6 supra. The discussion of the respective advantages appearing herein
closely parallels that of Shapiro and builds in part on many of the excellent points
developed by him.
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making and adjudication. Indeed, this author is largely indifferent
whether, on the balance of some particular aspect of comparison, rule-
making or adjudication emerges as the superior technique. The pur-
pose is rather to expose some of the unsound assumptions and in-
digestible generalizations which have been put forward in the literature
to support exaggerated claims on behalf of rulemaking as a "unique"
instrument for the making of administrative policy, and to show the
need for a more careful analysis of the choice of procedure issue and
its significance.
1. Notice and Participation
The primary fault in the NLRB's procedure in Wyman-Gordon
was the failure to comply with the APA requirements that notice of
the proposed promulgation of the rule appear in the Federal Register,
and that an opportunity be given to interested parties to participate
in the rulemaking.'2 Notice and opportunity to participate are com-
monly regarded as among the foremost advantages of rulemaking pro-
ceedings. Although the compulsory nature of the requirements does
distinguish rulemaking from adjudication in theory, it is erroneous to
conclude that the difference between the procedures is simply the
difference between notice and no notice, participation and no par-
ticipation. The difference is one of degree. In Wyman-Gordon, for
example, the Court points out that notice of the proposed rule was
given to certain organizations, which were also given an opportunity
to participate. Because the notice was not published in the Federal
Register, it was not sufficiently "general" and the opportunity to par-
ticipate was correspondingly limited to those who received selective
notice. That this did not comply with section 4 of the APA is un-
deniable, but since it still appears to be an open question when it is
appropriate to apply section 4, one may still ask what, if any, injury
was caused by the failure to give general notice and issue a general
invitation for participation by all interested parties? The Court under-
standably did not find it necessary to ask this question; there was no
way of accurately measuring it in the particular case, nor perhaps in
any particular case. But in assessing the virtues of rulemaking versus
adjudication in general terms, one may ask whether the notice and
participation functions are necessarily better fulfilled by strict com-
pliance with section 4 than by adjudicatory procedures.
Consider first the requirement for notice. Insofar as it is necessary
to insure essential participation by substantially interested parties, some
126 An additional requirement, that the rule itself be published in the Federal
Register, was also violated, but this seems to be of lesser importance than notice
of and participation in the proposed rulemaking. Compare 394 U.S. at 764-65
(Fortas, J.), with id. at 775 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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form of notice of proposed rulemaking is, of course, necessary. In the
case of some administrative agencies and of some proceedings, publica-
tion in the Federal Register may be the only way of giving notice to
all interested persons, but this is not true of all agencies or all pro-
ceedings. In some instances those most interested in an agency's
activities are more likely to rely on either the agency's own public
notice releases, trade journals, or reporting services other than the
Register. Where this is the case and where notice of proposed policy
action is given through these alternate means, it is hard to make a
strong policy argument for declaring the action invalid simply because
of failure to give notice in the Register.'27
Similar caution must be taken with regard to participation. There
is little, if any, dissent from the general proposition that an agency
should make every effort when formulating administrative policies
to see that the full spectrum of views is represented before it. This
is not merely a matter of democratic ideology, although that is cer-
tainly a significant part, but is a matter also of ensuring that the
agency has the broadest perspective on the issues being probed. Once
again, however, it is not true that full and adequate participation by
interested parties uniformly requires the proceeding to be cast in the
form of rulemaking. Agencies commonly provide for participation in
adjudication by a variety of means ranging from informal filing of
statements or amicus briefs, to full intervention as parties. 128  When
the alternative means of participation allowed by agencies is combined
with a judicial trend towards liberalizing rules of intervention,2 9 it is
apparent that the scope of industry and general public participation in
adjudication has been greatly expanded.
Of course, the nature of the adjudicatory hearing does place limits
on effective participation by broad segments of the public, making inter-
vention less viable practically than it might seem theoretically. Yet,
whatever the form of proceeding, the number of persons or groups who
can make a significant contribution to the shaping of any particular
administrative policy is typically quite circumscribed. To expand par-
3-7 Cf. Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 387 F2d 179, 183-4 (6th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
128 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§302.14.15 (1968) (CAB rules regarding informal
participation by nonparties and formal intervention); 49 C.F.R. §§ 1100.72, 1100.73
(1968) (ICC rules on formal intervention and informal participation); 47 C.F.R.
§§ 1223, 1225 (1968) (FCC rules on formal intervention and informal participation).
On the practice of the NLRB in inviting amicus briefs, see Peck, The Atrophied
Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 737,
739 (1961).
129 E.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (permitting intervention by representative "listeners" in
FCC license renewal proceeding). Cf., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (standing to appeal).
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ticipation appreciably beyond those who have a distinctive interest or
those who can make a significant contribution may add to the demo-
cratic character of the process, but this may not be worth what it costs
in efficiency to review the volumes of irrelevant, or marginally useful
commentary that sometimes descends upon the agency from such an
invitation. However, it is not the burden of sifting through vast
amounts of information that invokes the strongest caution. The
controversy that arises over public participation is often less a question
of the opportunity to participate than of the degree of involvement
which will be permitted. What is often sought, and what is very
often needed, is more than some procedure for the airing of general
views; it is rather the full and deep involvement by interested persons
in the shaping of agency judgment. The very facet of rulemaking
procedures which is applauded for permitting broad participation may
serve as well to keep the depth of involvement and the treatment of
specific, complex issues shallow. Participation in rulemaking pro-
cedures is not, of course, inevitably superficial; nor is it certain that
adjudicatory procedures will produce analytical depth. It is not un-
reasonable though to expect that adjudication would provide oppor-
tunity for more meaningful involvement. This must be-in part at
least-the assumption of those persons interested in agency policy who
press for an opportunity to do more than file written comments with
the agency.
2. Efficiency and Uniformity in Enforcement
The goal of efficiency needs no explanation or defense. If it can-
not be considered an ultimate concern of administrative law that tasks
be accomplished with the minimum expenditure of time and resources,
it is nevertheless a matter of large importance. Rulemaking may be
very efficient in eliminating the burden of individual case-by-case
adjudications. As the FTC, in defense of its trade regulation rules,
has stressed, rulemaking through case-by-case adjudication may be
a "prohibitively time-consuming, costly, and inefficient method of
dealing with a problem common to an entire industry." 0 The FTC
also emphasizes the advantage of uniformity which it refers to as "fair
and evenhanded" treatment of persons who, if the agency were to
rely entirely on the case-by-case method, might fall victim to
discrimination3"
13o FTC, Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed.
Reg. 8324, 8368 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FTC Statement of Basis].
131 Id. 8367. See also City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(Leventhal, J.) (cautioning that the court will review the development of policy
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But though it may be true that, in general, rulemaking is likely to
be more efficient and uniform than adjudication, the generality is not
as widely applicable as it sometimes is asserted to be. The FTC's
elaboration of these propositions is a case in point. The agency's
argument for rulemaking is plainly inapplicable to the very case in
which it was advanced, the cigarette advertising case. Adjudication
of industry-wide standards appears to be no problem here since the
total industry involved is comprised of a bare handful of companies
which could have been handily joined in a single proceeding. No doubt
the problem cannot always be so simply solved; in many cases the
number of members in the industry renders consolidation impractical,
if not impossible. Even here, however, if the Commission is con-
cerned about the problem, one wonders why it has only rarely made
use of the class action. 3 2  While the problems of showing an identity
of interest and of ensuring fair and adequate representation place limi-
tations on this device, 133 to the extent rulemaking is substituted for ad-
judication, the same limitations would exist for that procedure as well.13
3. Prospective Application
It is often said that, in contrast to adjudication, rulemaking acts
prospectively and thus eliminates the hardship that may result from
retroactive application of policy. But the distinction between rule-
making and adjudication in this respect seems greatly overdrawn.
The FTC, for example, contends that while adjudication is often
retroactive, under the APA "rules made in formal rule-making pro-
through adjudication with extra suspicion "lest an excessively individuated approach
may be a seed bed that is too favorable to the rank weed of discrimination").
In the area of trade regulation, the problem of selective enforcement is most
troublesome. Although selective enforcement may not be "unfair" in a general sense,
it may put certain competitors whose practices are challenged at a competitive dis-
advantage vis-a-vis those whose practices are not. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has upheld the discretion of the FTC to enforce cease and desist orders against one
violator in an industry before, or even without, proceeding against similarly situated
competitors. See FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967); Moog
Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) (per curiam).
132 Though the FTC's power to employ the class action device has been upheld,
Advertising Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F2d 108 (1st Cir. 1956), the occa-
sions of its use appear to be rare.
133 FTC use of class actions is vigorously attacked ("trials in absentia by class
suit") by former Commissioner Mason in National Paper Trade Ass'n. of the United
States, Inc., [1954-55 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1125,194, at 35,351-58 (1954)
(concurring opinion). On the aspect of identity of interests, cf. Contract Buyers
League v. F & F Investment, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 72,754, at 86,697 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 28, 1969) (judicial class suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). On the due process
requirements of notice and representations, see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
134 It is to be noted that, in any event, the trade regulation rules do not fully meet
the problem of disconformity and discrimination in industry-wide enforcement inas-
much as the rules can be enforced only by individual adjudications. See Auerbach,
The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L.
REV. 383, 457 (1964).
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ceedings (including, of course, trade regulation rules) are prospective
only. (§ 2(c))." -1" Such a statement demonstrates the degree to
which abstract thinking has triumphed over common sense. Merely be-
cause a "rule" is designed to be prospective, and is defined in general
terms by section 2 of the APA as having "general or particular ap-
plicability and future effect" does not mean that it must invariably be
prospective. On the contrary, rulemaking may often in practice have
about the same retroactive effect as adjudication.' The FTC's use
of rulemaking in the cigarette case is against a case in point. Had the
cigarette rule been implemented when first formulated in 1964, it
would have had the same retroactive effect on existing practices as
would a cease and desist order against the tobacco companies. The
same can be said of most, if not all, of the other trade regulation rules,
since they have been promulgated chiefly as a reaction to existing, not
future, practices. True, the promulgation of rules would be prospective
for firms not then engaging in the forbidden practices, but in this
sense so would a cease and desist opinion.
Rulemaking does, of course, avoid the problem of retroactive
sanctions, or at least the obloquy of condemnation. So far as the
FTC is concerned, however, this point has relatively little force. Since
no penalties attach to an FTC adjudication except upon subsequent
violation of a cease and desist order, the only possible retroactive pen-
alty in an FTC adjudication is the possible injury to reputation at
having been branded a law violator. It is doubtful that this has great
significance in the typical case where the FTC has promulgated rules.
The seller of TV sets who is told after an adjudication that his ad-
vertising of TV set screens is misleading unless based on diagonal
measurements or total square inches is not likely to be "hurt" any
more than when the FTC promulgates a rule to the same effect.'
37
Outside the arena of the FTC trade regulation, the concern for
avoiding retroactive sanctions or condemnation is more substantial,
particularly where there has been reasonable reliance on prior agency
135 FTC Statement of Basis 8367.
136 See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. Rv. 921, 933-35 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Shapiro] ; cases cited supra note 121.
137 See 16 C.F.R. § 410.3 (1969). In the context of the FTC's argument relating
to trade regulation rules, it is noteworthy that each of the cases in which the Com-
mission has promulgated rules affects particular advertising practices. Although a
"retroactive" order which forbids further use of certain advertisements may have some
effect on existing advertising contracts and promotional schemes, it is questionable
whether any substantial investment is being significantly affected or whether the firm
is seriously prejudiced because of its past assumptions that the practice was lawful.
In such cases the complaint of unfairness seems largely a red herring which disguises
the true thrust of the objection, which is to the promulgation of any order or rule
that adversely affects respondents' interests.
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determinations approving, or at least permitting, the conduct now
being proscribed. 3 ' However, it is far from clear why the problem
of retroactivity should be inextricably bound to adjudication. There is
no reason in principle why adjudicative determinations cannot be ap-
plied prospectively where fairness so warrants.'39 As discussed earlier,
the Court's decision in Wyman-Gordon may be interpreted as for-
bidding the prospective application of all policy developed in adjudica-
tion because, ipso facto, such prospective policy constitutes a "rule"
within the meaning of the APA. Of course, such a formalistic ap-
proach, whatever one otherwise thinks of it, eliminates the consideration
of retroactive versus prospective application as a basis of choice of
procedure; but if prospective application in adjudication is not for-
bidden, either by definition or by fiat, the argument cannot then be
made that rulemaking is a preferred technique because it acts prospec-
tively and adjudication does not.
On the whole, it is more responsive to the problem of retro-
activity to focus on particular situations in order to determine what
fairness to the parties demands, rather than to attempt to resolve this
problem by pronouncements on the inherent tendencies of general forms
of proceeding. At the very least, an attachment to general theories
about forms of proceeding should not obscure the possibility of varia-
tion in individual situations.
4. Procedural Freedom
One widely accepted reason for preferring rulemaking as a tech-
nique of policy-making is that the usual rulemaking procedures accord
greater procedural freedom to the agency than does adjudication. In
adjudication, it is said, the ability of the decision-makers to rely on
their "expertise" is limited by the formal requirements of adjudicatory
hearings and by the restrictions imposed therein. No doubt it is. Such
is typically the consequence of all legal requirements; but while not
all restraints can be justified, it is questionable whether the constraints
imposed by adjudicative proceedings have unduly or unwisely hampered
the administrative process. Certainly there are instances when it is
desirable to place greater reliance on experience and expert judgment
than is now done in many areas of the administrative process, but
we have not suffered from too little faith in and reliance on expert
wisdom. Professor Louis Schwartz's judgment that "[e]xpertness
138 See, e.g., NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Friendly, J.) (dictum).
139 Compare City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F2d 629, 641-43 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
with cases cited supra note 122. See generally Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative
Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. Rzv. 259, 260-62 (1938).
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has been oversold in this country," 140 seems accurate. Intensive work
in an agency may reward a member with an accumulation of knowledge
and experience about particular problems with which the agency deals.
But the same processes by which an agency member acquires intensive
knowledge and experience about a particular industry, program, or
set of problems tends as well to isolate him from other considerations
and broader concerns. Expertise all too often means narrow-
mindedness. This obviously does not mean that expert judgment and
experience is not to be used and never to be trusted. It does mean that
it should neither be trusted implicitly, nor be left subject to no greater
discipline than its own conscience. Removing procedural restrictions,
eliminating the requirement of a record hearing, and denying the use
of cross-examination and other requirements of the adjudicative process
results, in some cases, in the removal of a significant and salutary dis-
cipline from the process.
The attitude of commentators, and the courts to a degree, towards
the use of adjudicative procedures seems somewhat ambivalent. In
cases involving individual liberties, commentators, 14 ' and increasingly
the courts,'42 have deemed judicial methods of proof, especially cross-
examination, to be not only a fundamental requirement of fairness, but
a uniquely valuable tool for exposing error, falsehood, or bias. On
the other hand, in other cases, typically those involving some form of
economic regulation where the tasks are variously described as "alloca-
tion of resources" or "economic management," adjudicative methods
of testimonial proof and cross-examination have come to be regarded
by many as unsuitable and inappropriate.'3
It can be conceded that, for many tasks of regulatory planning, par-
ticularly those involving economic "management," adjudicatory pro-
140 Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 471 (1954).
141 E.g., 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.05 (1958) ; 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
142 E.g., Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
143. On the use of judicial methods of proof generally, see Reich, The Law of the
Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1241 (1966) : "Adjudication procedure is made
ridiculous when it is enlisted in an attempt to 'prove' planning by evidence." See also
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.06 (1958) ; L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF THE LAW 170-77 (1964); J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT 17 (1960). On the use of cross-examination in particular, see
Westwood, Administrative Proceedings: Techniques of Presiding, 50 A.B.A.J. 659
(1964); W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 866-68 (4th ed.
1960). The objection to testimonial procedures is somewhat softened by the increased
reliance on written presentations. See Gardner, The Administrative Process, in
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROw 108, 137 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959). The
FCC, the ICC, and the CAB all rely heavily on written presentations. However, it
should be noted that, except where parties agree to submit their entire cases on written
brief, the use of "canned testimony" does not dispense with cross-examination of the
testimony where facts are disputed.
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cedures are not well suited. In part, however, this simply reflects the
larger truth that for some of these tasks, government processes in gen-
eral are unsuited and inappropriate, 1" the functions being better left
to unregulated social and economic forces. But where these planning
tasks have been undertaken, it is an overstatement to generalize, as
some have done, that adjudicative forms of regulation are always
ill-suited and inappropriate to deal with them. To begin with, it must
be emphasized that the question here is not simply whether the pro-
cedures are well designed to effectuate the regulatory objectives, since
the choice of procedure problem seldom if ever arises, except where
those objectives materially, often adversely, affect private interests.
It is not then simply a matter of adopting procedures suitable to the
interests of public regulation; it is equally one of framing procedures
appropriate to evaluating and protecting affected private interests,
which-be they the interests of consumers, industry or others-are not
made less substantial by weaving them into the fabric of "economic
management," "social planning" or what have you. With the obvious,
but necessary, reminder that the aim of procedure is not the mono-
lithic one of efficiently serving the ends of regulation, we may consider
further some of the strengths and weaknesses of adjudicative formalities
in policy planning.
Challenges to the suitability of adjudicative methods (particularly
the reliance on testimonial evidence and cross-examination) where the
issues involve policy planning, appear to rest in large part on the notion
that "policy," or, to use Professor Davis' phrase, "legislative fact," is
something pure, uncontaminated by particular data and questions,
assumptions, opinions and biases which have been regarded as properly
the subject of such methods in other contexts. But a judgment on
policy or "legislative fact" invariably involves an admixture of par-
ticular facts, opinions, and biases, some of which may and some of
which may not be appropriate for exploration by testimony and cross-
examination. To say categorically that general policy questions or
"legislative facts" cannot fruitfully be explored by testimonial pro-
cedures and cross-examination is to generalize to an extent which can
only obscure analysis. Noteworthy in this respect is the Blocked Space
court's statement that the principal issue in that case called for "expert
opinions and forecasts" which "cannot be decisively resolved by testi-
mony" and is therefore the "kind of issue where a month of experience
will be worth a year of hearings." 14 The theory, apparently, is that
144 This seems an implicit premise of part of Fuller's criticism of adjudicative
methods. See Fuller, Adjudication and the Law, 1960 PRocEDUREs OF THE AmERIcA
AssocATIoN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1960).
145 359 F. 2d at 633.
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predictive judgments or forecasts are a class apart from "historical
facts," and techniques of testimonial proof and cross-examination are
inappropriate in determining the former even though appropriate for
the latter. Such a distinction seems untenable.
First, it is doubtful that predictive judgment is radically different
from determinations of historical fact. In both cases the determination
must almost invariably rest on general conclusions that are inferred
from particular factual data and an evaluation of probabilities that may
be as appropriate for testimonial proof and cross-examination in one
case as in the other.
Second, in some cases testimonial proof and cross-examination can
serve a more valuable function in testing forecasts and generalized
conclusions underlying future policy planning than in making findings
concerning specific past events. For example, assume that a witness
testifies before the CAB that in 1960 there were X tons of air freight
carried by combination carriers. American Airlines disputes this by
showing that it was only Y tons of freight. Cross-examination of the
witness would generally be of little utility in situations like this where
the fact in question can be readily and effectively disputed simply by
offering contradictory data. Suppose, however, there is no dispute
over the number of tons involved, but the witness takes the position
that most of the X tons of freight should be carried not by combination
carriers but by all-cargo carriers because this will strengthen these
specialized service carriers, which in turn will promote air freight and
also serve the public interest. If the witness's testimony is disputed,
the fact in controversy is what the Blocked Space opinion evidently
regards as "legislative fact," not appropriate for testimonial proof and
cross-examination. But is this sound? Even if there is no dispute
about specific identifiable "facts," such as number of freight tons in-
volved, and even if the Board's judgment cannot be proved or disproved
as easily as its finding as to the number of tons, it may still be desirable
to force the Board, through cross-examination of its experts, to disclose
the particular premises, including facts, opinions, and reasoning, which
underlie its "policy" conclusions.'46 Notwithstanding the absence of
any contest over the one readily identifiable "fact," cross-examination
of Board witnesses could play an important role in exposing possible
error, bias, or lack of solid foundation which cannot be effectively
brought to light simply by introducing rebuttal argument against the
generalized policy statements. At the very least it puts some burden
146 Cf. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States, 25 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 745,
764-69 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (upholding the right of parties to know the basis of FMA sub-
sidy determination, though not requiring cross-examination or "full-blown" trial-type
hearing).
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on the agency to explain and articulate the assumptions and the founda-
tions on which its policy rests. It has been observed that cross-
examination may not only expose many errors of judgment, but the
very prospect of cross-examination can impose a discipline on the
presentation . 4 7 Thus, the knowledge that a written exhibit containing
economic data and judgments cannot simply slide surreptitiously into
a giant record, but is subject to publicity by cross-examination, can
have a healthy disciplinary effect on the presentation of the evidence
and the ultimate decision-making process.
Naturally, some price is paid for these methods: they entail addi-
tional hearing time, which aggravates the problem of delay, and they
increase the size of the record in a case, which aggravates the difficulty
of defining the relevant issues and distilling the material facts. But
though these problems are considered to be among the chief disad-
vantages of adjudicatory procedures,-1 4 their cost may not be as great
as one might initially expect. Take first the problem of delay. While
delay is unquestionably present in administrative regulation, the prob-
lem tends to be exaggerated by reference to extraordinary cases which
are not fairly representative of the process as a whole. 49 Even accept-
ing the time honored view that delay is a major problem, it is still
questionable how much of it is attributable to reliance on formal pro-
cedures. Many of the common complaints about delay relate to routine
agency administration-processing of applications, petitions, and the
like. Here delay is not a product of the choice of procedure, but a
product of managerial organization and operation. Undeniably, delay
also exists in formal procedures; but adjudicatory procedure certainly
cannot be blamed for all of it. A recent congressional survey of the
major federal agencies indicates, for example, that testimonial pro-
cedures, and cross-examination in particular, were regarded by agency
personnel and practitioners before the agencies as only a minor cause
of significant delay."i Other attributes of adjudication-pleading, con-
tinuances, arguments on motions, and the like-were also listed among
the causes of delay, but they did not predominate over other factors
147 Symposium, Reflections on the Conduct of An Administrative Hearing, 20
An. L. REV. 101, 117 (1967) (comments of William Burt).
148 See, e.g., Reich, supra note 143, at 1242; E. REDFORD, NATIONAL REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS, NEED FOR A NEW LOOK 10 (1959).
1
4 9 See Gardner, The Administrative Process, in LEaAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND
TOmORRoV 108, 118-120 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959) (suggesting that the critics of
administrative delay have been "unduly critical").
150 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ON DELAY IN ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 9-13 (Comm. Print 1966). See also
Gardner, supra note 149, at 120, who lays much of the blame-and quite correctly--on
the attorneys who practice before the agency.
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which were not attributable to the particular procedures involved in
adjudication. A major factor in the responses of the personnel of all
agencies was the complexity of the problem, a factor which can scarcely
be attributed to the type of proceeding chosen. As one administrative
law practitioner observed:
The fundamental problem is not the nature of the process
but the nature of the problems with which the agency is deal-
ing. . . . There is no way that a proceeding like CAB's
current Traits-Pacific Route Case, involving as it does the
future of eighteen air carrier applicants and millions of
dollars in revenue, and the route structure of the whole
Pacific area, can be made simple or non-controversial. Com-
plexity and delay are inherent in the problem-whatever
process is used.' 5'
More troublesome than the problem of delay is that of unmanage-
ably large and diffuse records which, by their sheer size, frustrate
attempts to ascertain, organize, and use the relevant facts needed for
a sound judgment."' This is a problem which can exist quite inde-
pendent of the nature of the procedure chosen, and to assume that
it will disappear if we are clever enough to adopt the right form of
proceeding is to view the problem superficially. It has been asserted,
however, that attempts to formulate policy by adjudication invariably
result in the introduction of evidence bearing on every imaginable issue
that the agency might consider:
[S] ince it is tacitly recognized that the agency will be making
policy as it goes along there can be no limit to the relevance
of evidence. It is the limitless and unfenced range of the
agency's probable basis of decision that lies at the root of the
procedure problem.'
No doubt the submission of irrelevant evidence may hinder perception
of the correct course of action, and the absence of clear standards for
decision does make it difficult to define relevancy. But the conclusion
that the use of adjudication to formulate policy somehow leads in-
eluctably to irrelevance is mystifying. Why should it be asumed that
it is not possible for an agency in an adjudicative hearing (1) to define
the relevant issues and policies and to engage in "planning," or (2) to
control the admission of evidence? Considering particularly the dis-
cretion given to regulatory agencies to initiate proceedings on specified
151 Symposium, Reflections on the Conduct of An Administrative Hearing, 20
AD. L. REv. 101, 119 (1967) (comments of William Burt).
152 See Westwood, supra note 143, at 659-60; E. REDFORD, supra note 134, at 10.
'53 Reich, supra note 143, at 1241.
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issues, for example, by means of an order to show cause, 5 ' there is no
reason to suppose that the agency cannot shape adjudicative proceedings
in a manner conducive to effective policy planning.
4. Fairness to Parties
We are told that shaping adjudication to the demands of policy
may have unfortunate consequences for the parties involved in liti-
gation. The FTC, for example, warns that:
If the tribunal in an adjudicative proceeding is too intent
upon fashioning rules for future guidance, the task of render-
ing a fair result on the record before it may be slighted ...
[Consequently, the agency] may frequently fail to do com-
plete justice to the parties before it. 5'
Understandably, the FTC does not cite to us any cases in which it has
not done full justice to the parties because of its interest in promulgat-
ing policy. However, in support of the same general point, Professor
Peck has supplied some documentation from NLRB cases in which the
Board has "used" certain cases as vehicles for the promulgation of
policy at the expense of a careful analysis and fair and expeditious dis-
position of the case before it.' Peck's illustrations are persuasive
evidence that the use of individual cases as vehicles for broad policy
formulation can markedly conflict with the interests of justice to the
litigants in a particular case. In such cases it would no doubt be
preferable to employ formal rulemaking procedures rather than to
manipulate individual cases to accomplish this aim. But the conflict
between fairness to individual litigants is exaggerated when an attempt
is made, as the FTC has done, to draw from a few cases the grand
conclusion that fairness in adjudication and policy formulation are in-
herently incompatible. Some of the instances of rulemaking by the
NLRB may be rather extreme cases of conscious selection and manip-
ulation of individual cases for an ulterior end, having little relationship
to the case at hand. Yet surely not every occasion for policy pro-
154 On the use of show-cause order proceedings with particular reference to the
CAB, see Symposium, supra note 151 at 123-24, 139 (comments of William Burt and
Howard Westwood) ; Comm. on Licenses and Authorization of the Administrative
Conference, Licensing of Domestic Air Transportation by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, in SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, S. Doc. No. 24,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 342-43 (1963). Apart from the use of formal show-cause
order the CAB has virtually complete discretion to initiate proceedings dealing with
route awards, and wide discretion to shape the parameters of the proceedings, subject,
of course, to the requirements of the Ashbacker doctrine. See id. 341-42, 394-402.
'5 FTC Statement of Basis 8367.
156 Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 758-59 (1961); Peck, A Critique of the National Labor
Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1968). See also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759
(1969).
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nouncement in an individual adjudication leads to distortion of the
particular issue in the case. There is no basis for assuming, for
example, that if the FTC proceeded by way of complaint against the
Tobacco Institute and/or all of the cigarette manufacturers, that it
could not promulgate its trade regulation rule requiring health warn-
ings in cigarette advertisements and still do justice both to the par-
ticular issues in the case as well as to the long range policy objectives.
Since the adjudicative issues and the policy issues involved in this case
are virtually identical in substance and coextensive in their implications,
such an assumption would be unsupportable. Similarly, in the Blocked
Space case it is not easy to find any intrinsic conflict between "adjudi-
cative" issues and "legislative" policy which would have resulted in an
unfair disposition of the interests of the parties to the litigation if they
had been handled in an adjudicatory hearing. Whatever risk there
was in either of these cases, it should be of small concern since the
parties themselves were evidently willing to take that risk by demanding
a full evidentiary hearing on these issues.
5. Clarity of Policy Issues and Judicial Review
Just as greater attention to and fairer treatment of the interests
of individual litigants is supposedly ensured by separating general
policy concerns from those of an individual litigation, the argument is
also made that such a separation correlatively enables the agency to
focus more clearly on general policy issues, unobscured by the dis-
tractions of individual adjudicative issues.157 What is more important,
such separation makes the policy issues, and the agency's response to
them, more visible to the public eye. Justice Douglas, for example, in
his dissenting opinion in Wyman-Gordon remarks that rulemaking,
though no cure-all, "does force important issues into full public display
and in that sense makes for more responsible administrative action." 158
He adds that by exposing the policy issues more clearly, rulemaking
may facilitate judicial scrutiny of the agency's policy judgment.59
There is much sense in these observations. Rulemaking may often
serve a vital purpose of forcing the agency to clarify its policies and
thereby make them more visible to Congress, the public, and the
courts. However, despite the strength of this consideration, a word
of skepticism may yet be voiced. Discerning a problem is one thing,
acting on it, another. If we are concerned with the need for close
157 E.g, Shapiro 937-40.
158 394 U.S. at 779. Substantially the same point is well made by Hector, Prob-
lems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 943
(1960).
259 394 U.S. at 777-78 (by implication).
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judicial scrutiny of administrative action, it is not comforting to know
that the agency's policy judgment will be clear to the reviewing court,
unless that court is willing to examine the policy issues and evaluate
the agency's judgment. By casting policy in the form of agency
"legislation," rather than adjudication, it seems likely to diminish, not
enhance, the willingness of courts to scrutinize agency judgment. The
standards stated by the courts themselves recognize a difference in the
scope of review of adjudicative decisions under sections 7 and 8 of the
APA on the one hand and "legislative" determinations under section
4 on the other. In the former, the agency's judgment must be ex-
plicated by reasoned findings and supported by substantial evidence.100
The requirements imposed on the latter are less restrictive and review
is said to be more limited.''
It is, admittedly, quite difficult to demonstrate the degree to which
these formal differences have produced correspondingly different re-
sults in practice for the simple reason that the administrative agency's
substantive judgment is infrequently upset in any case.'6 However,
given the general reluctance of courts to challenge an agency's sub-
stantive judgment, the procedural requirements which attend adjudi-
cation may provide a convenient handle for the court to direct the
agency to reconsider. For example, the requirement in adjudication
.10 On findings in cases of adjudication, see § 8 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)
(Supp. IV, 1969) ; Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954) ;
City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F2d 583, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1965). On substantial
evidence, see APA §10(e), 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(E) (Supp. IV, 1969); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
161Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592, 602 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 369 F.2d 404
(3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967). In Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. Boyd,
244 F. Supp. 889, 892 (D.D.C. 1965), the court carefully distinguished review of rule-
making from review of adjudicatory decisions:
[T]he Court does not review a record of such hearings as it does records
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Such hearings are analogous to
hearings conducted by Congressional Committees. An Act of Congress need
not be supported by formal evidence introduced at hearings.
See also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) ; Pacific States Box & Basket
Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935); Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308
F2d 339, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
1
12 In Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n. v. Boyd, 407 F2d 330, 336-38
(D.C. Cir. 1968), the court, in discussing the difference between "informal rule
making" under § 4 and "formal rule making" after a hearing under §§ 7 & 8, distin-
guished between the findings and substantial evidence requirements of the latter and
the "concise general statement" of purpose requirement of the former. As a conse-
quence it concluded that "there will inevitably be differencesof emphasis and approach
in the application of the judicial review standards prescribed in APA § 10.' How-
ever, the court indicated that review of informal rulemaking "need be no less searching
and strict in its weighing of whether the agency has performed in accordance with
the Congressional purposes, but, because it is addressed to different materials, it
inevitably varies from the adjudicatory model." Id. at 338.
It is difficult to ascertain from this just how significant the court finds the formal
differences. In terms of policy decisions, the courts have recognized such an area of
"legislative" discretion, but it does not appear that this court reads these cases as
supporting a general thesis that there is no significant difference in judicial scrutiny of
rules promulgated in formal legislative rulemaking and those formulated in adjudication.
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that the agency make adequate findings may often provide the means
for telling the agency, in effect, to change its decision without seeming
to clash head on with the agency's substantive "expert" judgment." 3
C. Effective Policy: Promise and Performance
Whatever is said in the abstract about the various strengths and
weaknesses of rulemaking or adjudicative procedures, one can scarcely
avoid considering the end result to see what, if any, impact the pro-
cedures have had. It is here that so many of the assumptions about
the choice of procedure problem tend to depart from solid fact into
the realm of airy generalization and abstraction. The most marked
tendency is to assume that it is the widespread use of adjudicative
methods by the various agencies which is responsible for the "malaise"
of the administrative process--defined most frequently as the failure
of agencies to define clear policy guidelines and implement them in
reasonably consistent fashion.
Probably no serious student of administrative law today quarrels
with Judge Friendly's conclusion that in many areas of administrative
law there has been a failure on the part of agencies to define adequate
policy standards to guide their decisions. 64 This has come to be
treated as one of those "truths" of administrative law which all neo-
phytes must learn and the cognoscenti readily accept. What is not so
readily accepted is the conclusion that the crucial flaw lies in the
procedural forms adopted by the agency, and that by adopting rule-
making techniques, agencies will somehow correct the entire process.
For example, in the Blocked Space opinion, the court states that Judge
Friendly's analysis of the CAB's certification of domestic air routes
indicated that the "case-by-case technique as utilized by the CAB has
muddied the waters and operated to avoid an overall policy statement
of approach to the route structure." " It may be conceded that the
Board's approach to route planning, especially its vacillation on the
role of competition in airline route awards, has demonstrated, in
Judge Friendly's words, a "failure to grasp the nettle." 166 But it
should also be noted that it is not Friendly's conclusion that the
13See e.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967). It is hard to read Justice
Douglas's opinion for the Court without concluding that the failure of the FPC to
develop a full record and make adequate findings was simply a peg on which to hang
the Court's disagreement with the FPC's decision on the merits. The same appears
to be true of the First Circuit's two-time reversal of the CAB in Northeast Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 331 F2d 579 (1st Cir. 1964) ; 345 F2d 484 (1st Cir.) ; cert. denied, 382
U.S. 845 (1965). The Board finally got the message, Reopened New York-Florida
Renewal Case, 2 CCH Av. L. REP. 21,700 (CAB 1967).
164 H. FRIENDLY, THE FDERAL ADmiNISTRATIVE AGENcIES (1962) [hereinafter
cited as FRIENDLY].
1,5 359 F2d at 630 n.16.
1M FRIENDLY 105.
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Board's failure is necessarily due to case-by-case adjudication or the
use of adjudicatory forms. On the contrary, he concludes that the
Board could have enunciated policy and resolved the problem of
standards within the context of adjudication .1 7  The fault lies else-
where; to regard the Board's choice of procedure as the villain is to
ignore the substance of the trouble. Contrary to the suggestion of the
court in the Blocked Space case, the Board's inadequacies in this area
have not stemmed from failure or inability to perceive and formulate a
policy, as much as from its inconstancy in pursuing a single policy, its
persistent failure to articulate in its opinions the reasons for particular
awards, and especially its refusal to explain repeated departures from
earlier decisions and pronouncements.
For example, as early as 1943, the Board certified a third carrier,
Western Airlines, to the Los Angeles-San Francisco market in com-
petition with United and TWA. At that time, it made a general policy
pronouncement about a "strong, although not conclusive, presumption
in favor of competition on any route which offered sufficient traffic to
support competing services without unreasonable increase of total
operating cost." "I This policy pronouncement may or may not have
been perfectly compatible with congressional intent,"0 9 and it may be
hard to square with the Board's rejection of Western's application only
a few months earlier,' but it plainly was a defensible policy.' If the
Board had consistently adhered to it in subsequent individual cases,
giving more precise meaning to the general formula by its later ap-
plications in specific economic situations instead of moving backwards
and forwards on the question of competition,"r - it would undoubtedly
have escaped much of the criticism that has been directed at it. The
same point can be made with respect to other aspects of airline regu-
lation where the Board's inconsistent performance has invited sharp
criticism: the Board's erstwhile regional airport policy, for instance.'73
167 Id. 143-44.
168 Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., Additional N.-S. Cal. Servs., 4 C.A.B. 373,
375 (1943).
169 For an opinion that it is inconsistent, see FRIENDLY 77-78.
170 4 C.A.B. at 264.
17 See, e.g., D. LocKLiN, ECONOMICs OF TRANSPORTATION 806 (6th ed. 1966);
D. PEGRuM, TRANSPORTATION: ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 385 (rev. ed. 1968).
But see FRIENDLY 77-78, 98-99. Compare R. CAvEs, AIm TRANSPORT AND ITS REGU-
LAToRs 444-49 (1962), which advocates a comprehensive deregulation of the industry
in favor of allowing free competition in the trunkline markets. Of course, this pro-
posal contemplates a complete revision of the act and regulatory scheme.
172 See Jaffe, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 1068, 1074 (1956); FRmNDLY 74-105.
173 In City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F2d 583 (1st Cir. 1965), the court, reversing
in part one of the Board's major regional airport decisions, severely criticized the
Board for its inconsistency and its failure to develop policy standards for handling
airport consolidations. Criticism of the Board's actions not only in that case but
throughout the five-year history (roughly 1961 to 1966) of the regional airport
"program" iwas deserved, but it is not accurate to say that the problem was the Board's
1970l
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Attributing the Board's erratic performance in these areas to its choice
of procedures is superficial. Instead, the more basic problems should
be considered: dramatic changes in economic conditions affecting the
industry; the predispositions of a shifting Board membership; -17 and
the apparent inability of the Board and staff to forecast or make judg-
ments any further ahead than a couple of years. Finally, at least
part of the inadequate performance must be attributed to the in-
tellectual poverty of the Board's opinion writing staff which was, and
still is, unable to give credible explanations for controversial Board
actions, even where sound reasons exist.
Moreover, experience does not support the conclusion of the
court in the Blocked Space case that such deficiencies in regulatory
policy-making are likely to be significantly corrected by resort to rule-
making procedures. The blocked space policy is itself a case in point.
We are told by the court that rulemaking is uniquely suitable for
predictive judgment and formulation of policies and standards, as op-
posed to the inconsistency and vacillation which adjudication was
accused of producing. But what, in fact, was accomplished by the
rulemaking case before the court? The policy to allow only all-cargo
carriers to sell blocked space was adopted in August, 1964. Four
years later the Board abandoned the rule which had scarcely any impact
during this time, only one cargo carrier having offered blocked space
service.' 5 Of course, reversing a policy decision after such a rela-
failure to formulate a policy or to develop guidelines for its implementation. Id. at
587-88. The policy had been plainly, though generally, set forth in 1961 in a joint
CAB/FAA press release, CAB Press Release No. 61-17, FAA Press Release No. 52
(1961), and criteria for implementing it had also been formulated. See, e.g.,
North Cent. Area Airline Airport Invest., 41 C.A.B. 326, 346 (1964), aff'd sb nom.,
Outgamie County v. CAB, 355 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1966). The real problem was the
erratic, uncertain and inconsistent application of policy; it was what the Lawrence
court described as "prolific indifference" to its policy, to its criteria for implementing
the policy, and to earlier decisions dealing with the same issues. 343 F2d at 588.
Compare, e.g., the Board's handling of the criterion of airport accessibility in the
North Central case, supra, 41 C.A.B. at 331, with its disposition in Eastern N.C.
Area Airline Serv. Airport Invest., 40 C.A.B. 645, 646-47 (1964).
1
74 See CAVES, supra note 171, at 203; Hector, supra note 158, at 957. Including
the present membership of the CAB, some thirty persons have served on the five-man
Board since 1938. Of these less than 30% served a full six-year term. Fifty per cent
served less than one half of a full term. See 1968 CAB ANN. REP. 102. The problems of
shifting membership with corresponding changes in philosophical viewpoints are not
unique to the CAB. On similar membership shifts on the NLRB, with consequent
drastic changes in policy, see Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's
Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L.
REv. 254, 254-57 (1968). Such shifts are not, of course, all bad. A reasonably swift
turnover is a necessary cure for administrative somnolence.
17533 Fed. Reg. 15413 (1968). In its earlier notice of proposed rulemaking, 32
Fed. Reg. 16225 (1967), the Board explained its reason for abandonment of its earlier"experiment" as follows:
In our order on reconsideration . . . we noted that the blocked space policy
was not immutable, and would be subject to amendment in light of changing
circumstances.
It now appears that the policy confining blocked space exclusively
to the all-cargo carriers may be impeding rather than promoting the blocked
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tively brief time does not itself demonstrate an insufficient basis for
adopting the policy initially, but it should at least make one cautious
towards the court's pronouncements on the unique efficacy of rulemak-
ing proceedings in achieving stable and farsighted policy.
If the outcome of the blocked space rule suggests a more cautious
appraisal of the efficacy of rulemaking procedures, a review of the re-
sults of rulemaking by the FCC teaches outright skepticism. More than
any other major federal agency, the FCC has relied on rulemaking
procedure for the formulation of policy. It has employed rulemaking
procedures in the formulation of virtually all of its major regulatory
policies governing broadcast stations; its use of rulemaking procedures,
particularly in frequency allocations and assignments' 7' has been con-
space experiment as initially contemplated. When the Board promulgated
its policy in 1964 there were five operating all-cargo carriers, and it was
reasonable to assume that between them a reasonably broad based blocked
space service would be provided. However, since that time, two of these
carriers have ceased to operate, and of the remaining three, only Flying Tiger
has offered blocked space service. Thus, what was originally intended as a
specialized service offered by a class of several carriers, has in effect become a
service offered exclusively by a single carrier.
Second, it appears that it may no longer be necessary to confine the service
to a small class of carriers in order to permit the blocked space experiment
to be successful. In this connection, we note that there has been a very sub-
stantial growth in total air freight traffic carried by the airlines, and con-
tinuous improvements in air cargo equipment and facilities.
Finally . . . there has been a marked improvement in the financial pos-
ture of the all-cargo carriers. . . . EMlaintaining these carriers as the
exclusive providers of blocked space service may no longer be required as a
source of financial strengthening.
The Board's reversal of policy may be entirely reasonable but its explanation does
not completely dispel doubts about the need for or utility of the "experiment" in the
first place-or about the "unique value" of rulemaking in promulgating this short-
lived policy. Though the factors cited above may indeed justify abandoning the policy
of giving all-cargo carriers exclusive blocked space service, one may fairly ask whether
these factors should not have been foreseen by the Board in 1964-at least if rule-
making is as farsighted (uniquely suitable for "forecasts") as supposed. Consider,
for example, the demise of two carriers. Of these, only one, Slick, showed any interest
in blocked space service. An ailing airline for some time, it finally suspended opera-
tions in 1965, only a year after the blocked space rules were adopted. 1965 CAB
ANN. REP. 14. Slick was acquired in 1966 by another all-cargo carrier, Airlift
International, Inc.; CAB Order No. E-23879 (June 30, 1966). To the extent the
decrease in numbers of all-cargo carriers is thus regarded as significant, this was
probably foreseeable in 1964. The second explanation, that confining blocked space to
specialized carriers may no longer be required to promote and develop air freight
carriage, is sound enough in principal, but again it is difficult to believe that if the
original proceeding had been as forward-looking as rulemaking proceedings are
supposed to be, the growth in air freight that occurred in 1965 and 1966 could not have
been forecast in 1964. Making such economic forecasts would seem to be the very
thing the Board's "expertise"-here given complete procedural freedom-qualifies it to
do. The Board's third reason, that blocked space "may no longer be required" to
strengthen the all-cargo carriers because of the improvement in financial posture is
probably correct, but not complete. It should be added that the only carrier offering
the service-Flying Tiger-is now, and in 1964 was, least in need of strengthening.
See comparative cargo ratings and financial data, 1965 CAB ANN. REP. 89-90, apps. 5,
7; 1967 CAB ANN. REP. 13, tables 3, 6. It has now cancelled its blocked space rates.
CAB Release, 68-115 (Oct. 22, 1968).
17, E.g., Sixth Report on Television Allocations, 1 P & F RADIo aG. pt. 3, 91:601
(1952); Revision of FM Rules, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 1655 (1962); AM Station
Assignment Standards, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1658 (1964).
1970]
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sidered a model worthy of emulation by other agencies like the CAB
who are required similarly to allocate resources. 7 Yet, the FCC has
received little praise for the results of its policy planning efforts. In
1949, the Hoover Commission Task Force on Regulatory Commissions
charged that the FCC had "failed both to define its primary objectives
and to make many policy determinations required for efficient and
expeditious administration." I's In 1960, James Landis accused the
Commission of vacillation "in almost every major area" and of being
"incapable of policy planning." 179
A dramatic example of the unsatisfactory results of the FCC's
policy planning is provided by the long and tumultous history of the
VHF-UHF deintermixture "policy," one application of which was liti-
gated in the Transcontinent case previously discussed.is If the adop-
tion of rulemaking procedures has any inherent tendency to produce
effective, rational, long-range policy planning, it was not discernible in
the Commission's various rulemaking proceedings dealing with this
problem.
In 1952, after an extensive rulemaking proceeding, the Commis-
sion adopted a comprehensive scheme for assigning all television
channels to specific communities across the country.' 8 ' One of the
major considerations to be taken into account in assigning frequencies
was whether to make separate geographical assignments for VHF and
UHF frequencies. There was evidence that VHF and UHF stations
would not be economically compatible in the same markets because of
the disadvantages of UHF vis-A-vis VHF. 82 Notwithstanding, the
Commission adopted a plan of "intermixture" in which VHF and UHF
were assigned to the same market. This scheme of intermixture soon
foundered. Unable to overcome economic disadvantages, UHF broad-
casters petitioned the Commission to deintermix their communities by
substituting UHF channels for VHF.8 3 Having first denied the peti-
tions, the Commission reconsidered. In 1955, it instituted deinter-
mixture rulemaking proceedings to consider deintermixture in five
177See, e.g., E. REDFORD, NATIONAL REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, NEED FOR A
NEW LOOK 17 (1959).
C7 8 COMMITTEE ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, COMMISSION ON
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXEcUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT,
app. N, at 95 (1949).
179J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 53
(1960).
180 Text accompanying notes 78-84 supra.
181 Sixth Report on Television Allocations, 1 P & F RADIO REG. pt. 3, 91:601
(1952).
182 See Note, The Darkened Channels: UHF Television and the FCC, 75 H- v.
L. REv. 1578, 1579-80 (1962) (summarizing the arguments of the CBS and DuMont
networks against intermixture).
183 E.g., Monona Broadcasting Co., 11 P & F RADIO REG. 477 (1954); West
Central Broadcasting Co., 11 P & F RADIO REG. 482a (1954).
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markets. Though it terminated those specific proposals later that year
on the ground that the problem was too widespread to be solved by
changing allocations in only five markets,"' the Commission reinsti-
tuted rulemaking proceedings looking toward solution of the problem
on a nation-wide basis in 1966. As a result of these proceedings it
concluded that the most promising solution would be to transfer all
television to the UHF band. 5 As an "interim" measure, it instituted
rulemaking proceedings looking toward deintermixture in selected
communities. Some communities were deintermixed,'86 others were
not.'8 7 The basis for the distinctions was not always clear and the
rationale seldom convincing.8 s
As the "interim" deintermixture proceedings dragged on, the Com-
mission evidently forgot the policy it laid down, or almost laid down,
in 1956. In early 1959, it reported to Congress, in essence, that it was
still "studying" the allocation problem and various possible solutions,
but it had concluded that deintermixture was "ineffectual as a national
allocation policy," either as an interim measure or as a long-run solu-
tion. 8 9  In the meantime, it had decided on still another "interim"
solution (one which it had considered before but rejected) through
which new VHF channels would be added to large population centers
at less than the mileage separations on which it had based its table
of assignments in 1952,'° a solution completely at odds with de-
intermixture or with the all-UHF proposal.
184 First Report on Deintermixture, 13 P & F RADIo REG. 1511 (1955).
185 Second Report on DeintermLxture, 13 P & F RADio RE. 1571, 1577 (1956).
186 E.g., Peoria Deintermixture Case, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 1550c (1957), aff'd
sub nora., WIRL Television Co. v. United States, 253 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir.), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 358 U.S. 51 (1958), remanded further, 274 F2d 83
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
187 E.g., adison Deintermixture Case, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 1563 (1957) ; New
Orleans Deintermixture Case, 15 P & F RAnio REG. 1603 (1957).
188 Compare Peoria Deintermixture Case, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 1550c (1957), and
Springfield Deintermixture Case, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 1525 (1957), aff'd sub nora.,
Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 255 F2d 191 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 358 U.S. 49 (1958), zuith Channel Assign-
ments in Champaign-Urbana, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 1630 (1958). In the former
cases the Commission deintermixed Springfield and Peoria, Illinois, in order to make
-west-central Illinois all-UHF. At the same time, however, it refused in the Cham-
paign-Urbana Case to deintermix that community, notwithstanding virtually indistin-
guishable circumstances, and notwithstanding the fact that the signal of the one VHF
station in Champaign-Urbana covered significant portions of the area supposed to have
been made all-UHF in the Peoria and Springfield decisions.
189 Hearings on Television Allocations Before the Senate Committee on Interstate
and. Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4590 (1960).
190 Id. 4601. See Interim Policy on VHF TV Channel Assignments, 21 P & F
RADIO REG. 1695 (1961).
The history of short-spaced VHF assignments ("drop-ins" and "move-ins") itself
provides material for fertile study of the effectiveness of Commission rulemaking in the
area of allocations. The impetus for "drop-ins" in the years following the Sixth
Report was provided chiefly by ABC. ABC argued for a policy of "drop-ins" as a
means of providing a third VHF station (and a competitive outlet for ABC) in a
number of major cities to which the Sixth Report had assigned only two VHF
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Despite its report to Congress that selective deintermixture was
not effective, the Commission thereafter instituted proceedings to de-
intermix Bakersfield, California. Following rulemaking proceedings,
it ordered Bakersfield deintermixed in March, 1961.'19 However, the
Commission had not yet established a policy of deintermixture and was
hopelessly ambiguous about its plans for making one. Finally, in
August, 1961, it instituted rulemaking proceedings to consider whether
it should adopt a policy of selective deintermixture. At the time it
proposed to deintermix some 8 communities, 4 of which it had ex-
pressly refused to deintermix after rulemaking proceedings in 1958.1'
The search for a policy finally came to an end in 1962 when
Congress amended the Communications Act to allow the Commission
to require that all television sets shipped in interstate commerce be able
to receive UHF as well as VHF channels,' thereby eliminating a
prime cause of UHF competitive disadvantage. At the same time the
respective commerce committees of the House and Senate, declaring
national policy to be in favor of an intermixed system of VHF and
UHF, exacted from the Commission a promise to terminate its then
pending deintermixture proceedings.' 94 Following passage of the law,
the Commission accordingly declared a "moratorium" on its deinter-
mixture proposals.' 5 The suspension has continued in effect, notwith-
standing occasional petitions to reinstitute deintermixture.'9 6
channels-the result of which was (UHF channels being inferior to VHF) that there
was not an effective third outlet for the third major network. The Commission first
rejected ABC's drop-in proposals in 1956 in its Second Report on DeintermLxture, 13
P & F RADIO REG. 1571, 1575 (1956), opting instead for selective deintermixture. In
1957 it again rejected VHF drop-ins even as an "interim" measure pending long-range
revision of the allocations. Channel Assignments at Sub-standard Spacings, 13 P & F
RADIo REG. 1601 (1957). But ABC was insistent, and the FCC was something less
than constant. In 1960 it instituted another rulemaking proceeding to consider short-
spaced VHF assignments as a policy, and it concluded in 1961 that, as an "interim"
measure, it would consider in further individual rulemaking proceedings short-spaced
drop-ins in selected major cities. Interim Policy on VHF-TV Channel Assignments,
spra. But, although one of the short-spaced assignments contemplated in 1961 was
made, the VHF drop-in policy was abandoned in 1963, VHF Drop-ins, 25 P & F
RADIO REG. 1687 (1963). However, the Commission did not remain entirely constant
on its abandonment of short-spaced assignments. In 1964 it authorized a short-spaced
"move-in" of a third VHF channel to serve Baton Rouge, Louisiana. St. Anthony
Television Corp., 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 348 (1964), remanded for evidentiary hearing
sub nora., Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 347 F2d 808 (D.C. Cir.
1965). Subsequently the proposal to move a VHF channel closer to Baton Rouge
was modified to drop the short-spacing. St. Anthony Television Corp., 10 P & F
RADIO REG. 2d 38 (1967).
'9' Bakersfield Deintermixture Case, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 1549 (1961), aff'd
sub nom., Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC, 308 F2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
192 Expanded Use of UHF Channels, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 1711, 1714 (1961).
19347 U.S.C. §§ 303s, 330 (1964).
'94 S. REP. No. 1526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, 13-19 (1962) ; H. R. REP. No. 1559,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 18-26 (1962).
'95 Deintermixture Cases, 23 P & F RADIO REG. 1645 (1962).
'96See, e.g., Deintermixture in Madison, Wis., 9 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1535
(1967) (denying petition to reconsider deintermixture in Madison).
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If Congress had not intervened, one wonders if the Commission
would ever have developed a coherent policy on deintermixture. The
history of the Commission's efforts presents the sorry spectacle of an
agency desperate for a workable policy, but unable to formulate one,
despite a seemingly endless parade of rulemaking proceedings over a
period of more than seven years. Even if the fact is discounted that
the Commission's grand rulemaking proceeding (culminating in the
Sixth Report and Order) produced something less than the foresight
and rational planning supposedly the hallmark of rulemaking proceed-
ings,' 97 after viewing the Commission's subsequent, irresolute march
up the hill and an equally irresolute march down the hill in search of an
effective policy to save its allocations system, it is only with a sense of
ironic humor that one can speak of the "unique value and importance"
of rulemaking here as an administrative technique for evolution of
general policy.
This is not to suggest that different results would necessarily have
been obtained by the use of adjudication either in the case of blocked
space rules or in the case of deintermixture. The above examples are
offered merely as evidence of the rather simple proposition that rule-
making procedures are inherently no more productive of effective
policy-making than are adjudicatory proceedings. If the problems of
policy development are to be faced and solved, the regulatory process
must be analyzed in depth with less emphasis on the forms of agency
action.
III. CONCLUSION: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT FUTURE THINKING
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REFORM
Reviewing the literature on administrative law brings to mind the
ancient tale of the blind men of Hindustan, each of whom attempted to
describe an elephant by feeling various parts of the animal's anatomy.
Feeling the elephant's trunk, one supposed that the elephant was much
like a snake; another, upon feeling the elephant's leg, declared that the
elephant was more like a tree; while still another who leaned against
its broad side concluded that the elephant must be like a wall. As with
the elephant, so with the administrative process. The view of the whole
often tends to be based on and distorted by that particular part or
function which has been inspected, or with which the viewer is most
familiar. Mindful of this tendency, I have been loath to draw many
general conclusions about the subject at hand. To the extent that any
legitimate conclusions about the choice of appropriate administrative
19 For a criticism of the Sixth Report for its failure to learn a lesson from the
earlier problem with FM radio, see Note, The Darkened Channels: UHF Television
and the FCC, 75 HtAv. L. Rav. 1578, 1582 (1962).
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procedures are warranted, it is probably that analysis of the problem
has been hindered by too great an attachment to labels and abstract
concepts-indeed, by the entire framework into which the problem of
procedure has been cast for thirty years.
It is time to ask whether the approach of the Administrative
Procedure Act in classifying all administrative procedures as either
adjudication or rulemaking, and in attempting to prescribe procedures
in accordance with this classification, is not a hindrance to adapting
administrative procedures more closely tailored to the needs of different
agencies and distinctive agency functions. It is true, of course, that in
setting down certain basic, procedural standards for rulemaking and
adjudication, the APA does not mandate detailed procedures. It does
not necessarily preclude reasonable flexibility by an agency in adapting
rulemaking or adjudicatory procedures to the variable needs of the
agency and the interests of affected private parties. For example, the
prescription of an adjudicatory hearing does not preclude an agency
from allowing widespread industry and public participation through
intervention and presentation of testimony in written affidavits. Some
limits may even be placed on cross-examination.'98 By the same token,
the use of nonhearing rulemaking procedures clearly permits, as the
court in the Blocked Space case quite aptly instructs,199 appropriate use
of facets of adjudicatory procedure, such as cross-examination, oral
arguments, and the like."'
Having acknowledged that reasonable flexibility is possible within
the adjudication-versus-rulemaking dichotomy, the fact remains that
the present approach of the APA and the individual regulatory statutes
fosters a general tendency to adopt doctrinal distinctions which are not
conducive to a pragmatic use of either rulemaking or adjudicative
techniques. Moreover, the arbitrary distinction between modes of pro-
ceeding does not provide useful criteria for determining what are the
appropriate procedures in any particular kind of case. The same can
be said for the "adjudicative fact" versus "legislative fact" distinction.
These highly elastic concepts tend to obscure the varied needs of
different agencies and varied demands of different regulatory functions.
Future efforts in the direction of administrative procedure reform
should steer away from prescription of uniform procedures for the
entire administrative system and focus instead on specific procedures
198 Cf., Allied Van Lines Co. v. United States, 1969 Fm. CAm. R. 82,135
(C.D. Cal. 1969). See also Westwood, supra note 143.
199 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 843 (1966).
200 Of course, in some cases a full "adjudicatory" hearing is required by statute
for rulemaking. See note 5 supra.
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tailored to the distinctive functions of each individual agency."' In
evaluating the appropriateness of existing airline certification pro-
cedures, or in deciding what procedures should be used in the future,
it is not very helpful to think in terms of administrative licensing of
liquor stores, broadcast stations, or park concessions. From the
standpoint of prescribing even minimal standards, such a generalized
approach has often been as productive of confusion as enlightenment.
Instead of worrying whether the modification of airline certificates by
a regulation such as the CAB's blocked space rule is a function of
"rulemaking" or "adjudication," it would be more useful to ask: What
procedures are best suited to this particular type of airline case; what
procedures are best suited to resolving the particular issue of airline
freight service or the equities of certificate modifications of this type;
what private interests are affected in this type of case; who will desire,
and who should be permitted, to participate, and to what extent; what
are the administrative burdens and the time pressures that are involved
for alternative kinds of procedure in cases of this type? This list of
considerations could, of course, be amplified and refined, but it is
enough here merely to suggest in a general way the nature of the
approach.
This would, of course, undermine to some degree the attempt of
the APA to prescribe at least minimal uniformity of procedure among
the federal agencies, but this is not a very disturbing thought. It is
not at all self-evident that the CAB's blocked space proceeding required
the kind of procedures which would be used by the FCC to modify a
broadcast license. Nor is it as clear that it was any more appropriate to
use the same procedures used by the FPC to set provisions for price
changes in natural gas contracts.
This is not to suggest that there would not be certain uniform
procedures appropriate to all, or most, of these varied functions. But
such uniformity would not be imposed on the proceedings because they
are "adjudicative" or "legislative" in character, but would emerge only
out of basic similarities in agency functions and in the private interests
affected, where they were shown in fact to exist.
Candor requires an admission that this approach does not provide
any simple solution to the problem of prescribing appropriate adminis-
trative procedures. It will not always be possible to break down an
agency's business into distinctive "functions," each with its own dis-
tinctive procedures. There must be great room for flexibility in the
"mix" of various procedural methods in any given type of case. How-
201 For a similar conclusion in the context of state administrative procedure reform,
see Byse, Administrative Procedure Reform In Pennsylvania, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 22,
49 (1948).
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ever, by focusing on particular functions, on the kinds of issues normally
confronted, and on the parties normally involved and interested in that
function, it should be possible to deal with the problem of procedure in
a more pragmatic and useful way than by simply attaching the labels
"adjudication" or "rulemaking" to particular cases or issues.
Elimination of the rulemaking-adjudication distinctions would re-
quire the concomitant abolition of any varying standard of judicial
review based on this distinction. No special deference would be given
to agency action simply because it chose to dress its action in the
form of rulemaking rather than adjudication, a difference which cur-
rently seems to exalt form over substance.202 Hopefully, this would
force courts to scrutinize more carefully what the agency did, and how
it did it, rather than the label it chose for its actions.
Finally, at the risk of venturing a bit far afield of the primary
focus of this Article, a couple of broadly philosophic observations may
be hazarded. First, it is necessary to recognize that future adminis-
trative procedure reform, no matter how ambitious and well directed,
offers by itself only limited promise of significant improvement in
administrative regulation. The cases of the FCC and CAB discussed
earlier show that the failure adequately to define and consistently to
apply policy lies much deeper than the procedural forms in which
agency action (or inaction) is cast. Attempts to reform the regulatory
process by reordering of administrative forms is in large degree di-
rected more at the shadow than the substance of the problem. Atten-
tion to improved techniques of procedure must not be permitted to
obscure basic problems of administrative management, such as the
critical problem of personnel and leadership. The complaint that
many, if not most, of the major agencies suffer from an absence of
vigorous leadership and high calibre personnel is an ancient one.
James Landis pointed out the crucial need for better appointments ten
years ago,203 and the first Hoover Commission made a similar observa-
tion eleven years before that.2' Yet this complaint is a durable one,
202 Compare the criticism of the Blocked Space case by Mr. Howard C. Westwood:
There are things said in that opinion that really strike me as leading to the
possibility that the sky is the limit if an agency will just be cute enough to
dress up its language and go through the ritual of invoking the concepts that
are involved in rule making.
Symposium, Reflections on the Conduct of an Administrative Hearing, 20 AD. L. REV.
101, 139 (1967). This view may be a little extreme in regard to the Blocked Space
opinion, but it does point to the real danger of preoccupation with labels and form
instead of substance.
203J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO, THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 11-13
(1960). See also Friendly, A Look At The Federal Administrative Agencies, 60
CoL m. L. REv. 429, 444-45 (1960).
2 04 THE HoovER ComMrssIoN REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 431 (1949).
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and it is not apparent that significant improvement has been made in
this respect in the past twenty years.20 5 Absent some improvement in
this area, procedural reform is only cosmetic. What purpose is served,
after all, by telling an agency to employ rulemaking techniques in the
formulation of policies regarding competition if agency members are
collectively unwilling, or unable, to commit themselves to any firm,
clear position on the matter--or, if having done so, the policy set in
one year evaporates in the next as a consequence of new appointments
with ideological commitments against the policy?
Second, the procedural and managerial problems of administrative
policy planning cannot usefully be studied in isolation from the issues
of substantive policy itself. This is not the occasion for a monologue
pleading the need for more intensive consideration and study of the
substantive legal, economic, and social-not to ignore political-aspects
of regulation. That plea has been made by others. It nevertheless
bears repeated emphasis that no appraisal of the problems of adminis-
trative policy-making can be meaningfully complete without attention
being given to the vexing, often intractable, problems of policy itself.
It is not enough to complain of the failure of agencies such as the
CAB or the FCC to formulate viable and reasonably stable regulatory
policy. Consideration must be given as well to what the policy alterna-
tives are. To say, for example, that the CAB has failed to implement
coherent policy with respect to the role of competition in airline route
awards is useful only as a point of departure for analyzing the far more
difficult questions which remain: What policies should they adopt;
what are the relevant economic standards; how should those standards
be implemented in varied market situations; what is the impact of
technological factors; what are the political forces which must be
confronted and how can they be realistically and effectively dealt with?
Obviously, these questions are not easily answered, which may account
for their not being asked very often. Nevertheless, a complete evalua-
tion of the past performance of any agency and a realistic expectation
of what its performance should be in the future must face up to these
ultimate issues of administrative regulation.
205 See, e.g., the critical evaluation of the calibre of personnel and leadership within
the FTC in the recent REPORT OF THE ABA CommIssioN To STUDY THE FEDERAL
TRADE Cominssio 32-36 (1969).
